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 Which is more basic: rationality or reasons?  Regardless of how one tentatively answers 
that question, both rationality and reasons are typically held to turn on logic. Rationality and 
logic have largely been presumed as virtually synonymous.1 Whatever else they may be, reasons 
have typically been held as some logical relation between a situation/action/belief and some 
state of affairs which motivates or justifies it. In addition to being descriptive, this definition is 
also normative: there are good and bad reasons—and this judgment is typically indexed to 
logical soundness.2 De facto, people should act on good reasons.3  
 This is the traditional view.  However, it may be that the role of logic has been 
overstated, both in relation to rationality and reasons. Accordingly, a number of problems/ 
questions regarding rationality and reasons (and the relation between them) may be ill-formed. If 
this is the case, new understandings of rationality—its nature and its function —will be required. 
Any such reformation will have profound implications for the aims and methods of 
epistemology.   
 
II. 
“The mortal sin of the philosophers is not the pursuit of the absolute. Their great offense is that, as soon as they 
realize they have not found the absolute, they are willing to recognize as absolute on of the products of human 
activity, such as science, morality, religion, etc. Obviously, the state, just like science, morality and religion has 
great value—but only so long as it does not pretend to occupy the throne of the absolute…But men do not know 
how, or rather, do not wish to make this distinction. Idols are to them—why, one does not know—nearer and more 
comprehensible, than God.” 
Lev Shestov 
Athens and Jerusalem, Book II, X 
  
Before delving into our investigation-proper, it may be helpful to orient the reader with a 
few notes on the methods and styles which will inform our inquiry:  
 Our primary goal is to understand the nature of rationality. Traditional epistemology (as 
well as ethics and related disciplines) presupposes that justifications are, mutatis mutandis, 
reflective of mental processes: terms like beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. are held to be indicative 
of actual mental states. We will begin by assessing these axioms in light of contemporary 
cognitive science. While this literature is consumed by critical debates, there is widespread and 
growing consensus on a number of points which will be essential to our investigation—and we 
have other tools at our disposal for sorting through those issues which remain controversial:  
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 The method of Evolutionary Psychology will be a powerful aid for deciding between 
rival hypotheses and contextualizing these findings. However, a general problem with E. 
Psychology is that it is highly speculative. For any given phenomenon one wants to explain, 
there are possibly infinite reasonable stories which could be spun. The traditional method that E. 
Psychologists deploy in order to narrow the range of plausible accounts is Game Theory.   
However, for a host of reasons (some of which will be revealed over the course of this 
investigation), we find that method to be deeply problematic. Without a better way of grounding 
our narrative, we may end up replacing the fantasy epics of traditional epistemology with the 
science fiction of E. Psychology & G. Theory.  
 In order to actually reduce the speculative nature of E. Psychology, we will attempt to 
ground our narrative in the way events historically unfolded through the method of Critical 
Theory. However, C. Theory is, itself, a complex dialectical approach which explores the history 
of events, institutions, and ideas, synthesizing the resources of semiotics, sociology and 
anthropology.  
 Given the complexity of our argumentative strategy, we will need greater flexibility than 
many popular styles of analytic inquiry would permit. Accordingly, we will resort to aphoristic 
composition—much like the anti-philosophers Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, whose influence here 
extends well beyond style, also informing our methods and theories on a profound scale.  
 
III. 
 An important contribution of this work is its exploration of how scientific advances 
should fundamentally change the way we ask, understand, and answer a number of persistent 
philosophical questions. Moreover, we demonstrate why philosophers and scientists must be 
more aware of the cultural implications of their work, and the ways in which cultural contexts 
influence their research. While there are certainly some within the scientific community who are 
aware of this issue, there is a wide gulf between acknowledging a problem and meaningfully 
addressing it.  This work aspires towards the latter. Within the scientific community there is also 
a disturbing tendency (especially among the popular scientists who frequent TED talks and write 
bestselling books) to draw inappropriate conclusions from their research, well beyond the 
mandate of the evidence, while parading these ideologies around in the name of "science."   
 
In defiance of these trends, our philosophical inquiry is grounded by contemporary 
research and embedded in social contexts. We will refrain from making grandiose claims about 
such topics as the meaning of life, the existence or nature of the mind, soul, or God; we will 
avoid metaphysical conjectures about the ultimate structure of the universe, etc. Given the 
current limitations of the discipline, most of these are not yet scientific questions—they may 
never be. Nor are they armchair questions: it is impossible to reason one's way to a definitive 
answer. But neither are they pseudo-questions which should simply be dismissed (as Carnap 
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might suggest). Instead, they are more like James' "live options." Being confronted with these 
questions, one cannot avoid taking a position on them. The key is to recognize these views as 
axioms, or articles of faith—and not to delude oneself and others by selling them as "science" or 
"empirically demonstrated," or "rationally proven."  
  
So while we will expose many philosophical superstitions here, our work will be 
importantly different from that of the eliminativists, who are doubly-damned in the view of this 
author: first, for failing to understand the cultural significance of folk conceptions, and second 
for drawing inappropriate conclusions from insufficient evidence. We will not be arguing that 
folk psychological terms should be purged from the lexicon; nor will we be arguing that 
epistemologists' aim to understand how we think, or their method of studying justifications, are 
worthless. Instead, we will make the more modest claim that the study of justifications cannot be 
conflated with the study of mental processes. Because folk-psychological terms are oriented 
towards the former, so long as epistemologists focus on them, they will never be studying how 
people actually think.  
  
Accordingly, epistemologists find themselves in a dilemma. If they wish to continue 
studying justifications, they will need to formulate new aims for their inquiry, reforming their 
methods in accordance with said aims; epistemology will be a misnomer for this branch of study. 
On the other hand, if epistemologists believe it is more important to study how we think, 
justifications are going to be pretty much irrelevant.  Instead, epistemologists will need to ground 
their work in science, and index their research to particular "real world" problems. In all cases, 
pontificating from the armchair will be woefully insufficient.  
 
1  Typically, if a belief is illogical, it is held to be irrational as well. The same dynamic holds for behaviors and 
intentions.  As an illustration,  the classical conception of rationality could be well-summarized as follows:  
 
A reflective faculty which makes explicit and intentional use of rules of logic, mathematics, probability 
calculus, etc.  (in tandem with learned knowledge and personal experience) in order to solve problems or 
make determinations. 
  
2  There are many cases in which someone believes the "wrong" thing for the "right" reasons—in these 
cases, it is often still held that the agent's beliefs were justified despite being false. This is controversial within the 
literature-- but regardless of where people stand on this question, there is little dispute that, ceteris paribus, 
soundness is superior to mere validity with respect to justifications.  
Once the determination has been made (as to whether particular reasons are good or bad, however 
defined), there are typically gradients of how good or bad they are. Obviously, these judgments must be relative to 
some baseline, and it is a matter of dispute as to what that should be. There is a further controversy as to whether 
reasons are subjective or objective.  
3  While it borders on tautology to say that people should act on good reasons, there is significant ambiguity 
as to how goodness should be understood: Morally? Epistemically? Practically?  Similarly, what is most important 
to justify: desires, beliefs, intentions, acts?  
                                                          
 Cognitive Dissonance: Reasons v. Mental Processes 
"With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is 




Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future,  I.17 
 
I.  
 How well does the discourse of reasons map onto phenomenology? Not well. Talk of 
reasons typically concerns reflective, conscious, and/or volitional actions. Moreover, they 
typically portray reasons as antecedent to actions, beliefs, intentions, etc.; reasons are held to 
inform them:1 we act the way we do, believe the things we do, we hold particular aspirations for 
specific reasons. At least, this is the prevailing view in contemporary Western contexts… 
 
II. 
 One of the most powerful indictments of ethical decision-theory is that it is largely 
irrelevant which ethical system one ostensibly subscribes to; in most circumstances, they will all 
prescribe roughly the same course of action. Regardless as to whether or not one is a 
Consequentialist, a Deontologist, a Virtue Ethicist, a Particularist, or even an Egoist2— whether 
one is approaching ethics from a secular or religious viewpoint (virtually any religious 
viewpoint), a materialist or a non-realist perspective, etc.—one is typically not to lie, to steal, to 
cheat, to murder; one should try to treat people with respect, refrain from harming others, honor 
one's social commitments, etc. In virtually any circumstance in which someone would have to 
make a moral choice, there will be a broad consensus on the "right" course of action— especially 
for the sorts choices which ordinary people usually face in their daily lives.  
 For this reason, ethicists have to rely heavily on bizarre, extreme, and improbable cases 
in order to create any kind of substantive divergence between one ethical view and another.3  
And then, when confronted by these differences,4 should one ethical system suggest a "counter-
intuitive" result, rather than sticking by conclusions of these thought experiments, ethicists will 
perform all sorts of philosophical gymnastics in order to show that, actually, there is no 
divergence after all: their view is also compatible with prevailing intuitions. That is, after relying 
on these absurd cases in order to create some kind of substantive difference between one ethical 
position and another, ethicists spend a good deal of their time trying to erase these very 
differences and prove, if unintentionally, that it really does not matter if one adopts their own 
ethical system or another.  
 For instance, when Kant explains, at length, why we should not lie in the "murderer at the 
door" scenario,5 his successors have composed treatise after treatise attempting to explain why it 
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actually is morally permissible to lie in these extraordinary circumstances within the framework 
of deontological ethics.6 Or, when Consequentialism seems to imply that there are no such things 
as "rights," certainly not inviolable ones7—Consequentialist ethicists work out robust series of 
constraints which, in practice, would prevent counter-intuitive outcomes.8  Very rarely are 
ethicists willing to "bite the bullet" and simply accept that, within the framework of their 
ideology, one is morally obligated to counter-intuitive actions—indeed, to actions which may be 
personally costly,9 or may even seem morally repugnant from outside of their theoretical 
framework.10  
 The implication of these compromises, of course, is that ethical theories inform neither 
our convictions nor our actions.  Instead, non-reflective judgments lie at the core of morality— 
an ethical system is only worthy to the extent that it complies therewith; the discipline of ethics, 
at best, seeks to explain why we feel the way we do rather than what we should do. That is, in 
trying to reconcile their ethical systems with our moral instincts, ethicists implicitly surrender the 
normative aspect of their theories, whether they acknowledge it or not.11 But actually, the 
descriptive aspect of ethical theory proves problematic as well:  
In his "Unprincipled Ethics," Gerald Dworkin argues that the overwhelming majority of 
our actions are non-reflective, and we ascribe reasons to our actions after we make decisions—
not during or before.12 Moreover, because we do not have good introspective access to our non-
reflective processes,13 we tend to confabulate the reasons why we behaved in a given fashion, 
often in falsifiable ways. On these grounds, he argued that we do not seem to use ethical 
principles in making moral judgments; the appeal to moral reasoning which people use to justify 
their actions (post-hoc) likely bears little (if any) relation to the mental processes which actually 
motivated the behaviors.   
 
IV. 
 If moral decision-making is generally non-reflective, what of more purely "rational" 
processes, such as science or mathematics? Actually, we see the same trends. The processes of 
inspiration and discovery are largely outside of the bounds of consciousness or volition:  
we do not "will" ourselves to have breakthroughs. When we set our mind to a given problem, 
often our major advances occur after we "give up," turn our conscious mind to other tasks, sleep 
on it, etc. and then come moments of "clarity" or "revelation;" we have no control over when (or 
if ) this happens.    
 
It is after the "heavy lifting" has been done by our non-reflective processes that we 
systematize and rationalize our discoveries. To what avail?  Typically, in order to make them 
seem more plausible/ appealing to others.  The reason this work exceeds 70 pages of arguments 
as opposed to 2 pages of claims is because its author is not trying to merely convey ideas, but to 
persuade the reader. In anticipation of skepticism and objections, we will explore the 
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implications and applications of our theory. These concerns are more social than epistemic. That 
is, the purpose rationality plays in science, mathematics, and philosophy may have more to do 
with politics (broadly construed) than the pursuit of “the truth:”  
 
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn explores the hegemonic nature 
of "normal science," and the critical role that the popular adoption or rejection of paradigms has 
on the success of subsequent ideas (to say nothing of the significance of institutional and 
financial interests). The work of Foucault has focused intensely on the way norms like 
"rationality," "sanity," "truth," "reality,"  "expertise" and "professionalism" are deployed by 
social elites in order to manipulate the public (often with less than their best interests at heart). 
Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge highlights the critical role personal commitment and skill 
play in scientific advances; Lakoff explores the role of neurology in concept formation vis a vis 
mathematical, scientific and philosophical inquiry.14 Feyerabend highlights the centrality of the 
free association of ideas and playful experimentation in his Against Method. 15  Taleb 
underscores how many scientific discoveries were "stumbled upon" rather than actively pursued 
in his Black Swan.16 With regards to science, it seems as though the role of logic, methods, and 
rules has been dramatically overstated…or in any case, misunderstood.  
 Heuristics and non-rational processes play a huge (possibly, the essential) role in 
mathematics as well. If we actually did compute every step of a mathematical problem, it would 
be a severe constraint on the complexity of problems we could address.  However, a good deal of 
mathematics is essentially instinctual. When presented with "4 x 3" we do not calculate the 
product, we see the answer is "12."  For most of us, it would be as hard to recognize the equation 
"4 x 3 =__ " without seeing the solution as it would be to recognize the sequence of letters "a", 
"n," and "t" without seeing the word "ant." And the higher one goes in mathematics, the more 
theorems (which are essentially heuristics) one internalizes, and the more practice one does—the 
more mathematics becomes a non-rational process.17 That is, the more complex a problem has to 
be to even begin to evoke one's reflective processes in earnest.  
 
V. 
 In any of these cases (ethics, science, philosophy, mathematics), when asked to justify a 
given conclusion, one would offer something akin to an argument or proof. While these seem to 
be reports on how we came to our conclusion, it could be that these explicit justifications are the 
product of social norms bearing little relation to our actual mental processes. Are there reasons to 
suspect such a dissonance? In fact, there are plenty. Although we do not have introspective 
access to our non-reflective mental processes,18 there is abundant evidence suggesting they 
diverge far from conventions of rationality:19 
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Empirical Evidence Suggesting that "Reason" may be a Cultural Convention rather than a Fact 
of Human Nature 
 In Western cultures, logic and rationality enjoy such a close relationship that they are 
considered to be virtually synonymous.  There are historical reasons for this, which involve the 
West's idealization of ancient Greece and their supposed dedication to logos.20 While "Reason" 
came to be held up as universal, as the essence of humanity even, there is plenty of empirical 
evidence suggesting that “Reason” is little more than a set of cultural norms reflective of 
Western European values and history—particularly of the 17th and 18th centuries Anno Domini.21  
 This is not to say that other cultures are irrational; instead, that justifications take 
radically different forms in other cultures and in other times22—and these differences may shed 
light on what rationality is.23  For instance, the rule which is said to be the locus around which 
logic revolves is the Principle of Non-Contradiction: one cannot sensibly assert (P & -P). In the 
Western analytic tradition, it is this principle which differentiates valid proofs from invalid ones. 
However, asserting this axiom as universal is problematic:  
 The classical notion of Wisdom in Semitic (and Asian) cultures turned on the 
juxtaposition and/or reconciliation of apparently contradictory claims.24  Not only were true 
contradictions expected and tolerated, they were embraced: the highest truths were held to lie 
somewhere between irreconcilable points.25 As the possibilities open to God (or to the Universe) 
were not held to be subordinate to those of human comprehension, experience, expression, or 
even imagination—through meditating on paradoxes, one could transcend (false) limitations and 
experience [Truth] directly, if fleetingly.  
 Of course, with these radically different notions serving as the foundation of logic, 
dramatically different systems of rationality would emerge in these respective cultures26 
(exacerbated by the fact that these societies used different families of languages, relative to 
Western societies). 27  Accordingly, while Western standards and conventions of justification 
may say a good deal about our history, culture, and languages, they may not say much 
essentially about human nature, or human cognition. Moreover, while rationality plays a critical 
role in virtually all societies, its typical Western-ethnocentric conception does not.28 
 
Akrasia 
 Akrasia is an unresolved (and at times, irresolvable) tension between the conclusions of 
our reflective and non-reflective processes; or, between the mandates of rationality and what one 
actually believes, desires, intends, etc. Awareness that one is in an akratic state does little to 
resolve it.  Even being sincerely and fully convinced of one's normative obligation to abandon or 
commit to a given belief, desire, intention, etc., one may simply be unwilling or unable to do 
so.29 Of course, if there was a clean correspondence between rationality and human cognition, 
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akrasia should not even be possible, certainly not ubiquitous. 30 But it is both. 
 
The Difficulty of Mathematics & Formal Logic  
 If cognition was essentially logical, mathematics and formal logic should come naturally 
to virtually everyone; we should all be more or less adept, with a bit of training.  Instead, the 
virtual opposite is true: the overwhelming majority of most populations struggle to think in 
accordance with formal logic. For many, these tasks border on incomprehensible, even with 
dedicated study—and the more abstract these tasks are, the more difficult they become.31  
 Certainly, mathematics and formal logic represent ways in which people can think, albeit 
under the right circumstances,32 but this mode of cognition is certainly not the default.33 In fact, 
it tends to be very taxing: even under ideal conditions, people can only think in this manner for 
relatively short spans of time before performance begins to steeply decline (even for experts—
although, as previously explored, they do not have to think about as much of the content, having 
internalized it). If human cognition is indeed essentially logical, these phenomena seem 
inexplicable; after all, mathematics and proofs are logic in its simplest and purest form: this 
mode of thinking should be easier than others if our cognition were essentially logical.   
 
Chronic "Errors" (Biases & Heuristics)  
 Regardless as to whether one accepts the dual-process account of cognition or one of its 
rival theories, the heuristics and biases research (closely associated with Kahneman & Tversky) 
suggests rather powerfully that the overwhelming majority of human decision-making occurs 
through a set of non-reflective processes responsive to various cues and information formats.34 
These so-called "heuristics" are fast, frugal, and often quite accurate; in fact, we often override 
the conclusions of these processes to our detriment.35  
 However, reliance on heuristics also entails a number of biases, and relative to various 
schemes of rationality, they lead us “astray” in systematic ways. Moreover, these processes resist 
education: non-naïve subjects fare little better than laypeople when faced with the sorts of 
problems which evoke the systematic errors. And worse still, group deliberation often 
exacerbates, rather than moderates, these biases.36  
 The situation is not totally hopeless, however. One promising solution appears to be 
niche construction: designing our environments in such a way as to play to our cognitive 
strengths and compensate for our limits and weaknesses.37 Gigerenzer has demonstrated that a 
number of these biases and errors can be partially resolved through changing the way that 
problems and data are framed. Finally, we have developed a number of tools and technologies 
which can dramatically extend human cognition and memory in various ways.38 Notice, 
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however, that all of these fixes are external to the agent, who remains as "irrational" as ever. And 
as we will see later, this may not be a bad thing. 
 
Intuitions are Motivated by Irrelevant Consideration; they are also Unstable & Inconsistent 
 If our underlying mental processes were logical, we should expect our intuitive 
judgments to be consistent (among various types of people, or within a subgroup) and stable 
(over time and across relevantly similar problems and circumstances): they should follow rather 
directly from the salient features of a situation, and should not be influenced by "logically 
irrelevant" factors. However, virtually no part of this description seems to match the way our 
intuitive judgments actually work.39 Yet, despite the volatility of our intuitions, if asked to justify 
any particular intuitive judgment, we typically provide an explanation which conforms to the 
standards of rationality.   
 Not only does this volatility and inconsistency suggest a discord between our tidy 
standards of rationality and the way our cognition actually works, it also undermines the utility 
of intuitions as support for theories (as analytic philosophers are wont to do), given that theories 
must be consistent, general, logical, etc. 
 
Dumbfounding & Confabulation 
 Often, there does not seem to be an answer as to why we took particular actions or hold 
particular desires, preferences, etc.: why did one grab the blue shirt instead of the green shirt this 
morning? Why did one choose this particular route over another? Why does one find certain 
things beautiful, pleasurable, etc. and not others (or find one item superior to another)?  
Conversely, why does one find some things disgusting? When asked to justify these basic mental 
states, one often finds oneself dumbfounded; 40 no logical reason is even theoretically plausible. 
But if logic is foundational to our cognition, no judgments or actions should be unreasonable (i.e. 
inaccessible to reason)—certainly not the bulk of them.     
 While we necessarily have introspective access to our conscious (i.e. linguistically 
framed) thoughts as they are occurring, these represent an extremely small share of our total 
mental processes (broadly construed to include beliefs, intentions, feelings, desires, preferences, 
theories, etc. insofar as these concepts correspond to actual mental states).  Accordingly, our 
actions (informed by these mental processes) are largely non-conscious as well.41 Even for those 
(relatively few) actions resultant from conscious deliberation, our intentional commitments are 
often vague, broad and general; the specific methods deployed to execute these mandates are 
almost entirely reflexive rather than reflective; they are invented intuitively/ instinctually, ad hoc, 
in response to the unique, innumerable, and largely ineffable contours of particular situations, 
drawing on information and skills which are largely tacit. Accordingly, insofar as our actions are 
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rationalized, these rationalizations usually occur post hoc;42 essentially, we have to guess why 
we acted in a particular fashion. These guesses are typically influenced by subsequent 
developments or what would be convenient for us to propose in the present—and they are often 
falsifiable, even when subjects are trying to tell the truth.43  
 This confabulation occurs not only with regards to our actions,44 but also our beliefs and 
memories.45 We have a difficult time accurately tracing back the origins of particular pieces of 
information; we often misidentify the sources of our beliefs.  And however accurate they may or 
may not initially be, our memories change over time in light of other accounts of a given event, 
subsequent knowledge and experience, our evolving self-image, etc.46 —even to the point of 
producing sincere, vivid, nuanced, but ultimately false, recollections: misinformation can cause 
us to distort memories, other memories (often traumatic) can be suppressed or altogether 
fabricated.47  
  
These phenomena should be unexpected: if our mental processes mapped onto rationality, 
and especially if rationality were essentially logical, then our beliefs, memories, actions, etc. 
should be resultant from clean causal chains. At the very least, if we could not "backtrack" these 
chains for some reason, we should be aware of our ignorance: we should not unwittingly 
confabulate. But in fact, it turns out that conscious thought plays a far less significant role in our 
cognition (and accordingly, in determining our actions) than people have traditionally believed;48 
as we shall see, it could be that the dominant discourse is profoundly mistaken about the role of 
mankind's phenomenological capacities, and also their nature (insofar as they are perceived as 
“logical”).     
 
VI.  
"'I know what I want, wish, believe, feel,…' (and so on through all the psychological verbs) is either philosophers' 
nonsense, or, at any rate, not a judgment a priori."  
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein  
Philosophical Investigations, Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment, 309 
 
 
 Epistemologists typically hold that there is a tight connection between mental processes, 
explicit justifications, and logical rules. Individually, and especially collectively, the previously-
explored phenomena undermine these associations.49  There are dogmas implicit in each of these 
supposed relations:   
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Figure 1: Epistemology’s Implicit Axioms 
 
 For instance, underlying the supposed connection between our explicit justifications and 
our mental processes is the dogma of reductionism—i.e. the belief that language cleanly 
corresponds to objective phenomena “in the world.” Behind the presumed connection between 
mental processes and logical rules is the dearly-held view that human beings are essentially 
rational; this association motivates the descriptive aspect of epistemology. Finally, implicit in the 
connection between our explicit justification and logical rules is the supposition that good 
reasoning leads to good outcomes in the world: we should bring our beliefs, desires, intentions, 
and actions into compliance with logic because it will work out better for us if we do. This view 
motivates the normative aspects of epistemology.  
Over the course of this investigation we will demonstrate all of these axioms to be false. 
In doing so, we will call into question the entire discipline of epistemology: its methods and aims 
(both normative and descriptive).  
 
VII. 
 If mental processes are not "rational," how can we make sense of them?  Moreover, what 
does rationality come to mean if it does not refer to mental processes? Answering the latter 
question will occupy the bulk of the forthcoming discussion, so let us offer some cursory 
remarks on the former before moving on:  
 While our mental processes may not be cleanly reducible to logical rules, they are not 
random either. The supposed (mutually-exhaustive) opposition of logos to chaos has its origins 
in Manichaeism; it is a thoroughly religious conception falsified by the natural world (wherein 
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order and regularities arise organically over the course of myriad interactions): it is a false 
dichotomy.  There have been some works which aspire to advance positive theories without this 
bias (demonstrating how cognition can be non-logical but also non-random);50 however, as this 
work intends to explore conscious (i.e. rational) processes, we will have little to say on the 
matter here—in any case, it is not an "armchair" question. However, our investigation of the 
latter question may have implications for the former, which can be explored more rigorously in 
the empirical sciences.  
1  In epistemological circles, beliefs and desires are typically held as things which people have a good deal of 
control over.  Often, the conclusion of epistemological case studies is that the agent in question should change his 
beliefs, abandon his desire, or withhold judgment altogether—as an understatement, these are much easier said 
than done. An epistemology which is not grounded by the ways people actually form beliefs and make judgments, 
one which does not account for the constraints on human cognition–such a project seems rather worthless, at 
best.  
2  The divide between the Egoists/ Immoralists and more "conventional" moral philosophy is one of the few 
authentic fault-lines in the discipline of ethics; but even they often succumb to the desire to compromise—
reconciling their positions with traditional morality for the sake of increasing appeal. As an example, see Lester 
Hunt's "Flourishing Egoism."  
3  The sheer outlandishness of many proposed counterfactual scenarios renders these examples nearly 
useless for practical morality. Because the situations in question are so extraordinary, it can be difficult to see how 
to relate the outcomes of these hypotheticals to one's everyday life. They cannot even teach us how we should go 
about making ethical decisions, as the deliberative process is so radically removed from our own:  these examples 
typically present their reader with a precise number of clear options, small in number (typically, 2) with 
unambiguous outcomes which are known (not merely anticipated) in advance of the decision in question, removed 
from all social context, and wherein the reader is given virtually infinite amounts of time to consider the case in 
question, which remains static as he considers it. No part of this description would apply to “real-life” ethical 
quandaries.   
4  Most apparent differences between the mandates of ethical systems are not, in the final analysis, the 
result of different values but of how shared values should be prioritized or fulfilled; Rachels, “The Challenge of 
Cultural Relativism.”  
5Kant, "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altrusitic Motives."  
6 e.g. Herman, "A Mismatch of Methods"  
7  For instance, Jeremy Bentham famously and repeatedly referred to the idea of natural rights as "nonsense 
upon stilts." 
8 e.g. Shaw, "The Consequentialist Perspective"  
9 Cohen, If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? 
10  Even when ethicists are willing to conceptually accept counter-intuitive conclusions and extraordinary 
ethical demands— in practice, they do not act on them.  That is, despite some persistent differences in theory, 
there would be very little variation in ethical practices between professed adherents to various ethical systems 
within a given context.  
Consider the case of Peter Singer: in his "Famine, Affluence and Poverty," he holds that the citizens of 
"developed nations" are all obligated to dramatically lower their own standards of living and redistribute all excess 
wealth to the "third world" in order to ensure that no one lives in absolute squalor (while others live in 
decadence).  
He holds that this is a personal obligation, which bears on the individual—regardless of whether or not 
the government is willing to fulfill this obligation (although the individuals should also democratically pressure 
their representatives to comply). He argues that people should live in humble dwellings, hold few possessions—
purchasing anything they can second-hand.  He condemns, at length, the idea that people should place more value 
on their own family, friends, and countrymen than on strangers across the world.  
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And yet, Peter Singer enjoys a much higher standard of living than the average American, let alone the 
average citizen of the world. He maintains an upscale residence in Manhattan; he travels in luxury cars; he arrives 
for speaking arrangements in tailored suits of the modern fashion; he regularly eats at fancy restaurants and 
enjoys cozy vacations— in short, he is far from living to the point of "marginal utility" (despite the 10- 20% of his 
substantial income he donates to charity); and his family is similarly provided for.   
When confronted by this apparent hypocrisy, he simply acknowledges that he is "no saint," as though this 
self-mortification resolves the tension of his continued preaching of our need to live at the level of "marginal 
utility" paired with his continuing to ignore this mandate himself. We are not discussing the occasional hypocritical 
act resultant from some fleeting weakness of will, but of an intentionally and consistently hypocritical lifestyle (see, 
"Questions for Peter Singer").  
However, probably the single most amusing example of this hypocrisy is that of Paul Johnson. In his 
Intellectuals, he details at length the ways in which various members of the intelligentsia consistently and 
dramatically violate the precepts of their own philosophies. After a series of detailed case studies, he suggests that 
we should not value ideas more than the character of their propagators (how you live says a lot about what you 
really think. If there is a consistent disparity between one's words and actions, we should question their reliability).  
Despite the book's heavy focus on the way these other intellectuals mistreated their families, neglected or 
betrayed their commitments, etc. it was later found out that Johnson had been carrying on an extra-marital affair 
for over a decade (see, "The Rise and Fall of Paul 'Spanker' Johnson").  
 
In order to avoid the charge of ad hominem, consider the following: ethicists dedicate their lives to these 
theories— they are, unquestionably, the most passionate advocates of their respective ethical systems.  And if, 
despite their passion, their knowledge, and their relatively easy lives—if they cannot manage to live in a manner 
roughly commensurate with the ideals they are promoting, it seems unreasonable to expect (and indeed, demand)  
that others live them better. In some cases, it seems outright immoral: for instance, when intellectuals call upon 
their countrymen to fight and die in the service of some ideological system while they retreat into the safety of 
their ivory towers to cheer them on.   
And yet, it is very rare than an ethicist is in the newspaper for making bold and heroic decisions in pursuit 
of their ideals, for rolling up their sleeves and trying to make a direct and positive difference on the “frontlines” of 
horrific situations, for making extraordinary sacrifices, etc. The men of action who do perform these feats of valor 
rarely explain their choices in terms of complex ethical systems or principles— they typically respond that they 
were just "doing what had to be done."  
 
And so, out of fear, moral laziness, self-interest, etc. the few remaining differences in ethical theories 
ultimately get buried, in practice. As a result, the discipline of ethics seems more like a cynical ploy for the 
intelligentsia to manipulate the public than a set of genuine convictions acted out in one's life. 
11  In the first place, the reason ethicists must rely on these extreme cases is that, in practice, we have no 
need to appeal to any ethical theory to make our decisions. Within a given context, we simply know what is right— 
and we do it, fail to do “the right thing,” or we actively choose to do something we know to be “wrong.” 
Regardless of which path we choose, we typically know where our actions stand morally. That is, extreme cases are 
necessary insofar as the discipline of ethics is theoretical because they introduce ambiguity into morality, contrary 
to our typical experience.  
12  To supplement Dworkin's claims: in his  "Moral Heuristics & Moral Framing," Sunstein explores research 
suggesting that we make our moral decisions in much the same way as most of our other decisions—by heuristics, 
keyed to particular cues and data formats.  Lakoff explores similar themes in his Don't Think of an Elephant!  
In "An Unprincipled Morality," Dancy argues that there is no way to tell what is "right" outside of the contours of 
particular situations: abstract, hypothetical, and counterfactual scenarios have little applicability for the "real 
world."  Similarly, ethical principles have little-to-no use practically or even normatively. And it isn't a big deal; 
ethics, he argues, can get along just fine without them. People do not really rely on them in making decisions—and 
it is hard to see why they should. Principles and reasons are primarily used for justification.  
13  We do not even have good introspective access to our desires. We are pretty bad at determining what will 
make us happy, how happy it will make us, and for how long. Similarly, with unhappiness.  
Gilbert & Wilson, “Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of Future Affective States.”  
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14  Gallese & Lakoff, "The Brain's Concept: The Role of the Sensory-Motor System in Conceptual Knowledge;" 
Lakoff & Nunez, Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being.  
An important subtext of their work is that we can never know if the apparent order in the universe is a feature of 
some "objective reality," or merely a result of our cognitive- perceptual hardware and software.  
15  The way the discipline of science proceeds seems to mirror the way our thought processes work: dramatic 
breakthroughs followed by periods of rationalization (Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions).  
Profoundly, while scientific processes seem to mirror phenomenological ones, it may be that the 
phenomenological processes themselves mirror biological evolution: in The Plausibility of Life, Kirschner & Gerhart  
demonstrate that evolutionary change seems to proceed through sudden and dramatic biological changes (albeit, 
with conserved core processes), followed by periods of "deep conservation."    
In his The Black Swan, Nassim Nicholas Taleb argues that virtually all significant and enduring changes—be 
they personal, social, technological, or biological—are the result of (often cataclysmic and always highly 
improbable) "black swan" events.  Because these events are, in a profound sense, unreasonable (within the 
framework of a given culture/moment), they are not amenable to being predicted, manufactured, or controlled. 
These revolutions are often followed by conservative processes which stabilize and hegemonize particular 
changes.  
Rationalization should be understood in this fashion, insofar as it is logical.  Consider: logic is always and 
only truth preserving, never truth creating; the best it can do is render as explicit connections between premises 
which were formerly implicit. Logic is an inherently conservative process.  
16   Taleb goes on to argue that there is a wide gulf between theory and practice, invention and 
implementation, discovery and application. For each of these couplets, there are typically different sorts of people 
who do the latter as compared to the former. The transition from the first phase to the second is non-linear, and 
the specific ways that the novelty in question is implemented, applied, or put into practice is typically far-removed 
from the vision of its progenitor. Of the two, the latter is much more difficult and less glamorous—but much, much 
more important. In fact, the former phase is useless in the absence of the latter.  
Moreover, even the people in the former phase tend not to be scientists, academics, or even 
professionals in the fields they inadvertently revolutionize. And their discoveries, again, are often more the result 
of serendipity, or else “tinkering” rather than reflecting from the armchair.   
17  With regards to mathematics, it is more challenging to "show one's work" than to derive the correct 
answer. The “heavy lifting” is not the calculations, but the justification. 
18  It may seem as though we are begging the question here, as the existence of an unconscious mind 
(mutatis mutandis, compatible with a dual-process view of cognition) is controversial—as is, indeed, the existence 
of a mind, at all (according to eliminativists).  
While these debates are interesting and important, they have little bearing on the matter at hand. For our 
purposes, it will be sufficient to show that, whatever else one wants to say about human cognitive processes, they 
do not seem to correspond to logical rules, nor to our explicit justifications.  Positive claims about cognition 
beyond this would be empirical matters which demand more evidence than can be offered from the armchair—in 
fact, a conclusive answer demands more evidence than science has at its disposal, to date.  
19  Regarding our reflective processes: our conscious thinking is rational—this should not be surprising, as 
such thinking is framed in social languages. While there is much that is objectionable in Grice's theories on 
linguistics, he seems correct in asserting that languages such as English, Arabic, Japanese, etc. are necessarily 
social; people use these languages with communicative intent. Even in the case that we are thinking to ourselves, 
we use the language as though we are talking to others. In fact, often we do talk to ourselves (audibly).  To frame 
our thoughts in these languages is to rationalize them.  Conscious thinking is the translation of our mental symbols 
into communicative symbols (that is, a translation of our language of thought into "social" languages).   
The point of social languages is to facilitate the exchange of critical information/ ideas (that is, the “gist”).  
However, even for this, language always underdetermines its referent—the correspondence between language 
and [that which is] will necessarily be vague and indirect. Moreover, our interpretation and use of a given language 
is not uniform; the way various members of an audience interpret a given expression will not be identical to one-
another, nor to the intentions of the speaker. Also, not all thoughts will be easily translatable into social languages.  
For all these limitations, language works well enough (to fulfill its telos). And language is not meant to do "all the 
work" on its own: 
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As Wittgenstein pointed out (Philosophical Investigations), the "content" of a linguistic expression is 
largely derived from its context (cultural, syntactical, situational, etc.); moreover, language is often augmented by 
other forms of communication (the tone and inflection of the expression, accompanying gestures, posture, facial 
expressions, visual representations, etc.)—in fact, the overwhelming majority of human communication is non-
verbal.  
20  In order to understand how deeply misguided these evocations of antiquity are, consider the 
Renaissance-era “revival” of the Greco-Roman aesthetic, which could be easily summed up as “white marble.”  
In keeping with most polytheistic societies, the actual Greco-Roman aesthetic was extremely bright and colorful—
even gaudy. Statues and temples were covered in ornate paint designs. However, the pigments that the Romans 
used were typically not durable-enough to withstand the ravages of time, weather and conflicts.  
Meanwhile the Renaissance-era artists and intellectuals of Western Europe did not know of antiquity by 
means of any active or living tradition—instead, through second-hand accounts and the (relatively few) surviving 
texts of various Greek thinkers, preserved and annotated by the Muslims, recovered during the Crusades, 
translated and circulated among the few literate and interested souls of the day, and eventually re-popularized 
among social elites by Petrarch (d. 1374 AD), who integrated ancient philosophy with Western European 
interpretations of Christianity in order to respond to the intellectual crisis of the day: the collapse of scholasticism 
under the nominalist critique (Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity) .  
Due to their general lack of understanding about Greco-Roman society and culture, upon encountering 
statues and temples bleached by the elements, Western Europeans assumed this to be the aesthetic of antiquity—
even to the point where they would wipe clean traces of color they found on ruins, believing the paint to be the 
work of vandals. However, traces of color may still be found on some of newly-discovered works which have not 
been “fixed.” And with the help of contemporary tools, we can get a much better sense of how these pieces 
originally looked. For instance, the work of artist Vinzenz Brinkmann is oriented toward restoring this aesthetic 
through painstaking research and attention to detail.   
Nonetheless, the neo-classical aesthetic persists globally: from the White House to modern Egypt—an 
emulation of ruins, not of Rome; a testament to the profound discontinuity of the monolithically-described 
“Western” civilization and to the mythology surrounding its proudest cultural artifacts. This will be an important 
subtext of our investigation.   
21  While most prominent Greek philosophers believed that mankind may be essentially rational, they did not 
believe people were predominantly rational (indeed, this was *the* problem). Even in Plato's utopian vision of 
society ( Republic),  he concerned himself primarily with the extreme minority he viewed as capable of rational 
action, and the institutions these people should erect in order to control the masses. Ultimately, he acknowledged 
that such a society was destined to collapse because rationalism simply ran contrary to human nature—there was 
no question of making all men rational; such an endeavor would have been understood as sheer folly.  
However, Enlightenment era thinkers would come to interpret rationalism within the framework of the 
Christian messianic ideal; the result was an essentially evangelical form of rationalism, complete with a mythical 
Golden Age (Greco-Roman antiquity), followed by a fall from grace (the collapse of Rome, followed by the Dark 
Ages) — there was hope for the redemption and perfectibility of man, rendering conversion an imperative. There 
was even the belief that Reason would save us from our societal problems and eventually usher an age of universal 
peace and prosperity (positivism and its forbearers). Out of this hope developed the need to destroy "false 
religions," which, within this framework, meant religion itself.  
Nomenclature notwithstanding, the Enlightenment did not come about as a result of the majority of the 
population simply "coming to see the light" through Reason. Instead, the Enlightenment began with the Reign of 
Terror— wherein nobles and religious leaders were rounded up, tortured, and killed en masse by a radical minority 
of extremists. Religious monuments were destroyed, churches were re-appropriated. Thereafter, these elites 
seized power (through the vacuum their killings had created) and instituted an authoritarian state wherein those 
who were suspected of harboring counter-revolutionary sentiments were tortured and/or killed with little-to-no 
due process.  It was illegal to display religious indicators on one's house or one's person, it was illegal to 
congregate for religious rituals (upon penalty of death)—and it stayed that way for decades.  If one wanted to 
survive (let alone thrive) in France, one had to adopt secularist/ rationalist positions.   
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When Napoleon took power, he decriminalized Christianity, although this was only to more effectively 
promote Enlightenment ideology, in light of the failure of state-sponsored rationalist cults (more on them soon).  
The priests were subordinated to the State rather than Rome, and they were made to tailor their messages in the 
service of Enlightenment ideals.  Simultaneously, the church's sphere of influence was dramatically narrowed due 
to his policy of laicite. And then, Napoleon spread this form of government by the sword to the rest of Europe (the 
Napoleonic Wars)—instituting laicite on all conquered peoples (i.e. most of Europe), and ultimately crushing the 
Holy Roman Empire militarily. This legalistic imposition described above can be, and was, dramatically aided by co-
opting the dominant symbolism and ideology of the culture (Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society):  
Enlightenment ideology was able to "take" among Europeans by explicitly playing on messianic symbols, 
etc. There were two spectacular examples of this:  following the popular failure of Robespierre's Cult of Reason (Le 
Culte de la Raison), which attempted to worship reason itself, without the positing of any deity—the intelligentsia 
of France attempted to rationalize the divine through the Cult of the Supreme Being (Le Culte de l'Etre Supreme); 
this "supreme being" was essentially the god of the philosophers: an entity who, while the creator of the universe, 
was neither all-powerful nor infinitely sovereign. Instead, this god was constrained by Reason: the supreme 
principle in the universe to which even "god" must be subordinated. Although both of these cults ultimately failed 
(despite being the only legal "religions" in France at the time), they are indicative of how the Enlightenment 
proceeded: it may be that the West's neo-classical ideal bears little relation to the ancient Greek thought, owing 
more to monotheistic absolutism than it does to Plato et alia. That is, Western "rationalism" is not so "rational," 
after all. 
22 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?  
23  While all cultures develop standards of rationality, as we will see, there are certain social arrangements 
which will make rationality more or less central to the society at large. Similarly, within a given society, there will 
be certain sectors where rationality is more (or less) important, relative to the broader culture.  
24  In contemporary usage, especially in analytic philosophy, labeling something paradoxical is shorthand for 
“impossible”—but again, this notion is relatively new: the term “paradox” was not widely used until the mid-
sixteenth century. Even then, the term typically denoted a statement which, while seemingly absurd, was in fact 
true—or, a statement which, while self-contradictory, was not necessarily false. That is, even in Western cultures it 
was understood (until very recently) that a proposition being paradoxical did not entail it being false.  
25  Drawing on this notion of Wisdom, in Slavoj Zizek's The Parallax View (p. 26), he argues that, "…the status 
of the Real is purely parallactic and, as such, non-substantial: it has no substantial density in itself, it is just a gap 
between two points of perspective, perceptible only in the shift from one to the other."  
26Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently… and Why. 
27  As the "Sapir-Whorf" hypothesis posits, language profoundly affects how the world is framed in conscious 
thought and public discourse. This, in turn, would have substantial implications for the development of standards 
of rationality in particular cultures. 
28 Weinberg, Nichols & Stich, "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions." 
29  A particularly interesting case is that of "Aliefs," or "implicit attitudes." Often, these dramatically 
contradict our explicit beliefs.  In, "The Motivated Use of Moral Principles," Uhlmann et alia  show that, in "trolley 
problems,"  white people who self-identify as political liberals tend to be much less willing to sacrifice someone for 
the "greater good" if the would-be martyr has a "black sounding name" (Tyrone).  Conversely, they were much 
more willing to sacrifice someone if the victim's name suggests whiteness and/or affluence (Chip Ellsworth III).  
Despite this apparent bias in favor of black people, when white liberals take implicit association tests, they 
tend to robustly associate black features with negative traits (see, "Stealthy Attitudes" by Lambert). These aliefs 
tend to be extremely resilient, and can guide our actions in subtle and nefarious ways, albeit not always for the 
worse (consider the white liberals on the trolley problem: overcompensating?).  Implicit attitudes are just one 
example of the ubiquity of akrasia.  
30 Davidson, "Paradoxes of Irrationality."  
31  Some of this difficulty can be mitigated by framing problems in different ways, as Gigerenzer's research 
suggests ("How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning without Instruction: Frequency Formats").  However, many of 
these problems persist in spite of these efforts (Kahneman & Tversky, "On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions: a reply 
to Gigerenzer's critique").  
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32  If subjects are uncomfortable, tired, distracted, under stress, etc. performance at these reasoning tasks 
drops very quickly. Given the rigors and unpredictability of the Pleistocene environment in which our species 
evolved, this is not a result we should expect for our essential mode of cognition.  
33  Until the 17th century, mathematics was not widely known or used. Engineering tasks, from the 
construction of the pyramids to the building of Roman temples or Medieval castles—not only were they built with 
the simplest of tools (levers, pulleys, chisels, man and horse power, etc.)—but also without appeal to algorithms, 
models, projections, calculations, etc. Outside of the rudimentary arithmetic used in markets (typically addition or 
subtraction by abacus), mathematics was considered an intellectual diversion with little real-world application. 
Even the much-lauded Pythagoras was considered in his own time as a kook, a cult-leader. Most Greeks were not 
clamoring to implement or celebrate his ideas. In the West, mathematical tasks relied on Roman numerals until 
after the Crusades, which introduced the Arabic numerals currently used; even the mathematical concept of “zero” 
was absent in the West until this time. Into the 13th Century there were only a handful of people in all of Western 
Europe who even knew how to perform division, let alone anything more complicated.   
That is, humanity’s most enduring and celebrated artifacts had little need of mathematics or other 
abstract knowledge. Most great inventions and advances in technology were (and are) built by people who did not 
know why or how they worked from a scientific or mathematical perspective. They relied instead on tinkering, tacit 
knowledge, traditional heuristics and tricks passed across generations of craftsmen. Nonetheless, in narratives 
about “science” often co-opt these breakthroughs by highlighting how scientists eventually figured out the 
mechanics of a given technology, etc.—albeit, often after it was already widely proliferated and in use. Although 
the trajectory of was from invention to theory, rather than theory to invention. 
The contributions of mathematics and directed scientific inquiry to human history is much newer and 
smaller than most people assume--a critical reading of scientific, medical and technological breakthroughs makes it 
glaringly-obvious that the ivory-tower variety of “knowledge” is much less important or valuable than typically 
described (especially and unsurprisingly, in academic circles). In fact, revolutions often happen in spite of the 
intelligentsia, not because of them: again, logic is inherently conservative—including the logic of various fields, 
disciplines and institutions; intellectual “gatekeepers” were often the nemesis of sociological and technological 
evolution (although this struggle can itself often be productive). The recent vintage of many of these abstract fields 
helps explain why mathematics and formal logic remain so difficult for most people—they are, in a sense, 
unnatural (artifactual) modes of cognition, the products of particular sociological circumstances. 
34 For an excellent summary of this research, Daniel Kahneman's Thinking Fast & Slow 
35 Gigerenzer, Todd et al., Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart.  
36 Sunstein & Hastie, "Four Failures of Deliberating Groups."  
37 For elaboration on the notions of "ecological rationality" and "niche construction" see: 
Todd et al., "Ecological rationality and its contents;" Sterelny, The Evolved Apprentice; Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge.  
38 For a robust survey of the relevant literature here see The Extended Mind.  
39Alexander & Weinberg, “Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy."  
40 Haidt et al., "Moral Dumbfounding: When intuition Finds No Reason."  
41 In his The Tacit Dimension, Polanyi explores the sheer quantities of ineffable knowledge we possess, which 
profoundly inform our "reflexive" actions (and often our "reflective" ones as well).  
42 Here referring to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc, as opposed to the more mild ex post.   
43 Bar-Anan et al., "Inaccurate self-knowledge formation as a result of automatic behavior."  
44 Nisbett, "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes."  
45 Johnson,  "Source monitoring and memory distortion" 
46  Memory is not the same as experience—both because memory is imperfect in catching/ preserving 
details without corruption, and also because one reflects upon one’s memories from one’s current mental state.   
When one calls upon one’s memories, our minds do not simultaneously regress into their state at the time the 
memory was impressed.  
47 Loftus, "Memory Distortion and False Memory Creation"  
48 DL Smith, "Natural Born Liars"  
49  We should note that much more could be said of each of these topics, and many more classes of 
examples could be added to them in order to demonstrate the dissonance between our mental processes and 
logical rules.   
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As an easy anecdote, consider the apparent irrationality of dreams (insofar as the recollections are 
accurate)—given that they are held to be expressions of our unconscious mind, if our underlying mental processes 
were essentially logical, the apparently surreal nature of dreams seems rather difficult to explain.  
50  In his, "What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?" Van Gelder provides an overview of some 
promising counter-models; when viewed in context of Lakoff's research on the neurological origins of 
mathematics, etc. it seems as though we must reconsider the nature of, and relationship between, logic and 
cognition.  
 Etymology: Rationality & Reasons 
 
"A radical shift from previous forms of thought was occurring. Ernest Gellner calls it the 'Big Ditch' in the history of 
human cognition because it separates the modern West (and by now most of the world) from everyone else in 
history. Just to suggest the magnitude of the change...the following terms were not yet in use in the sixteenth 
century:  'Adjectives such as 'absolute' or 'relative'; abstract' or 'concrete'; 'intentional,' 'inherent,' 'transcendental'; 
nouns such as 'causality' and 'regularity'; 'concept' and 'criterion'; 'analyses' and 'syntheses'; 'deduction' and 
'induction,' 'coordination' and 'classification.' Even the word 'system' came into usage only in the middle of the 
seventeenth century. 'Rationalism' itself was not christened till very late in the nineteenth century.'" 
Robert Bellah 
Religion in Human Evolution, p. 40 
 
 Our investigation has hitherto suggested that the epistemologists' notion of rationality is 
deeply problematic; it is our project to provide a better account. Towards that end, it may be 
fruitful to consider the etymology of the central terms ("rationality" and "reason"). Both words 
share a common root:   
 
Df. ratio  (Latin) =  To reckon or calculate. The term was most commonly used in the 
context of business transactions.  
 
Rationality 
 In the classical context, the term ratio denoted a comparative measuring: of an individual 
to a group, of a sub-set to a set, etc. The term has retained this meaning in the mathematical term 
"ratio:" 2:1 odds of a given outcome, 3 out of 4 dentists endorse Trident, etc. This meaning is 
similarly preserved in the verb "to ration," which is to set aside some portion of a larger whole. 
Within this context, the term "irrational" would not have meant "inferior," "foolish," etc. Instead, 
"incomparable," something closer to uncanny.  
 It was not until the 1630's that the term came to be used in the contemporary fashion, by 
comparing a given act or individual, not against actual others "of its kind," but to some 
idealization; a given phenomenon was "rational" to the extent that it resembled its "Platonic 
form" (or, it was rational in those aspects which resembled said abstraction).  
 
Reason 
 We have explored evidence that reasons are not representations of mental states or 
processes; instead, utilitarian confabulations, albeit, often unconscious. Accordingly, let us revise 
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our understanding of "reasons" to denote explicit justifications provided to others. There is 
etymological support for this move, as well: 
 The term "reason" is a translation of the French raison which is, itself, a translation of 
ratio. Ratio is often said to be a translation of the Greek logos,1 whose root verb is to "count, tell, 
say, or speak."  Notice that this verb is oriented externally and socially,2 not introspectively or 
psychologically.3 We believe this is the correct way of understanding the term and its 
derivations. Henceforth, "reasons" will refer exclusively to explicit justifications. From this 
starting point, we will derive a theory of rationality.
1  Appealing to the philosophies of Plato et al. will be of little help to the rationalists. While many ancient 
Greek philosophers revered the Logos, they had a radically different understanding of it than that of 
Enlightenment-era thinkers. The Logos was the supreme principle which ordered the universe; it was not a faculty 
which people possessed—it was external to agents (and agency). 
While Plato and Aristotle did posit a human faculty ("intellect") which was responsive to the Logos and 
superior to other faculties—even to the point of Aristotle holding it as the definitive human trait—there was not a 
robust notion of intentionality accompanying it.  People's actions were determined by their constitution and their 
upbringing rather than their "free will." Even the reflective faculty's purpose was merely to push people to submit 
to the Logos (as opposed to submitting to the spirit or the passions). The goal was to arrange one's life (and 
broader society) in order to allow one deterministic force to prevail over other deterministic forces. So the 
"intellect" of the ancients is not really doing the same work as "reason," in modern discourse. It would be 
anachronistic to assert that contemporary or Enlightenment-era thinkers are talking about the same thing as the 
ancient philosophers.  
2  There are vestiges of the classical meaning in the contemporary usage of "reason," as well.  For instance, 
when we say of someone that they are being “unreasonable,” we usually mean that they are unwilling to negotiate 
or compromise. When we define something as "reasonable" we usually mean "acceptable" (e.g. a reasonable 
price). Again, considering that the primary domain of ratio was business transactions, these are probably the most 
natural meanings. As it relates to the Greek point of origin, consider that the contemporary term "logo" denotes a 
symbol for a brand.   
3 Given this understanding of logos, illogical would mean "ineffable," not deficient or false.  
                                                          
 Rationality & the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis (MIH)  
"You'll reply that reality hasn't the least obligation to be interesting. And I'll answer you that reality may avoid that 
obligation but that hypotheses may not."  
Jorge Luis Borges 
Death and the Compass  
 
I. 
 In "The Social Origins of Folk Epistemology," Hugo Mercier argues that rationality was 
likely developed in response to social, rather than environmental, pressures. Specifically, he 
argued that rationality was developed in order to better manipulate others and avoid being, 
ourselves, manipulated. That is, rationality is not about discovering "the truth.1"  
 Of course, any evolved capacity can come to be used for a number of purposes; 
rationality is no exception. However, as we have hitherto suggested, social manipulation remains 
the primary end towards which these capacities are utilized—even in domains such as science or 
philosophy. Mercier's claim also helps explain the ubiquitous and systematic "errors" in reason 
(relative to various logical models): whenever one utilizes a faculty outside its proper domain, 
these anomalies should be expected. While Mercier's argument is important, its implications 
have not been sufficiently explored:  
 
II.  
 Under the MIH account, rationality serves as a mediator, helping to avoid and mitigate 
social conflict (or conflicting interests). But it is not an objective or impartial mediator; instead, 
it is de facto self-serving.2 In his "Distrusting Reason," Hilary Kornblith highlights some of the 
myriad ways in which we deploy rationalization, often unconsciously, to further our own ends, 
shore up antecedent beliefs, and justify our actions (either planned or committed).3  
 Rationality also fails to be objective4 to the extent that there are asymmetries between 
states of affairs and our abilities to produce reasons to justify them. That is, certain people are 
great at rationalization, and they can produce compelling justifications even if "the facts" are not 
on their side.5 Others are less capable, and may fail to provide compelling arguments, even when 
an extremely powerful case could be made. And should a dispute arise, the "winner" in most 
situations will be the person who is best at convincing himself, his interlocutors, and any relevant 
others—not the person who is most honest, the most logical, the most knowledgeable, etc.  
 Rationality maps imperfectly onto logic6—imperfectly because often the maximally-
effective rationalization will be, strictly speaking, illogical. One need not comply with logic to 
be persuasive: in many situations, one will fare better appealing to ethos or pathos, or to sneak in 
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logical fallacies.7  And to the extent that these arguments are successful, they are superior to 
more logical arguments, or even "truer" arguments, relative to the telos of the faculty.8  
 However, it is important to note that "the truth" is not especially important for logic, 
either. In formal logic, a proof can be valid (i.e. formally perfect) without being sound (i.e. true). 
Validity is seen as the more foundational of the two (a proof can be valid without being sound, 
but cannot be sound without being valid); indeed, a number of formal proofs are never "cashed 
out" in the real world, such that soundness is even relevant (to include a good deal of philosophy, 
unfortunately). That said, the correlation between logic and truth, tenuous as it may be, is 
actually stronger than the one between rationality and truth.  A logical argument is "guaranteed" 
to be truth-preservative:9 the conclusion will be as strong as the premises, if the argument is 
valid. This guarantee holds with rationality only insofar as a justification is logical.  
 
III.  
 Given the preceding considerations, we have arrived at a point where we can offer up 
more robust definitions of reasons and rationality, which will inform the rest of this examination.  
 
Df. Rational (arguments)= providing or exploiting reasons/justifications in order to 
persuade (typically) others to act in a particular way and/or accept or resist a given belief 
or state of affairs.  
Df. Rational (actions) = providing or exploiting threats/incentives in order to 
persuade (typically) others to act in a particular way and/or or accept or resist a given 
belief or state of affairs.  
 
Given these definitions, compliance with various logical standards would not be the proper 
method for evaluating rationality. Instead, rational arguments/actions should be weighed in terms 
of their effectiveness (relative to the aforementioned goals).10  
 
IV.  
 On this account, rationality is related to reasons teleologically: reasons are the means of 
realizing the aims of rationality.11  Rationality is in the business of persuasion and doubt; reasons 
are its currency. Upon reflection, this definition should not be terribly controversial. Consider the 
cases in which reasons are provided: typically in cases of a conflict or challenge, either actual or 
anticipated.12  
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 To whom are reasons provided? Typically, they are offered to those one is, in some 
sense, accountable to.13 Reasons are provided when one is unable to, or uninterested in, stark 
coercion. In cases of absolute authority, justification is superfluous.  One may indulge 
subordinates by providing justification, but there is no obligation to do so, and it is largely 
irrelevant whether or not the reasons offered are satisfactory. To help motivate this point, 
consider the situations where justifications are typically absent, or even inappropriate: parents to 
young children, kings to their subjects, prophets to their acolytes, military officers to their 
soldiers, etc. In these situations, proclamations are made, demands are offered, and compliance is 
expected—challenges or non-compliance are usually met with sanctions of varying severity.   
 
V.  
 Understanding rationality through this lens has a good deal of explanatory power; 
consider the Enlightenment: "reason" took a central position in Western culture at a time when 
socio-cultural authorities were being undermined and overturned. We can also see why 
rationality would have been central to a democracy like Athens: in contexts where people are 




 Given our definition of rationality, it will be an ill-formed question to ask whether or not 
people are rational. Rationality applies to arguments or actions. Also, asking whether or not 
something is rational will be trivial. In the case of arguments, de facto, yes.  In the case of 
actions, sometimes. The substantive question(s) will be, were the actions or arguments effective? 
and/or how effective were they? Accordingly, we would also evaluate reasons in terms of 




 It should also be apparent that the subjective/objective distinction of rationality and 
reasons is ill-formed: justification is essentially social and objectivity is impossible. As it relates 
to the supposed "subject" of subjectivity—identity is a social construct, as is consciousness 
(insofar as conscious thought relies upon social languages). For all of these distinctions: 
subjective v. objective, social v. individual, natural v. abstract, "the self" v. "the world"—at best, 
the boundaries are fluid and highly-permeable; it may be that, beyond linguistic and/or cultural 
conventions, there is nothing which divides them at all.
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1  While Mercier contents himself here with discussing norms of rationality, he is drawing from a larger 
tradition. The Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis holds that, not only our social norms, but also our raw 
intellectual capacities largely evolved as a result of these same social pressures.   
This view was originally put forward by Bryne & Whiten, who edited two volumes exploring the matter, 
Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans and 
Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations. 
2  According to the MIH, our rational faculties evolved, not to help people cooperate, but to manipulate 
others in the service of one's own ends, and to avoid being so manipulated (to one's detriment). In either case, 
while oriented towards others, the faculty is self-serving. e.g. Cosmides & Tooby, "Cognitive Adaptations for Social 
Exchange." 
3  Commensurate with the MIH, Kornblith highlights how the more intelligent we are, the harder it is for us 
to escape using reason for self-serving, even self-deceptive, ends. That is, smarter people are more prone to biases, 
and are more resistant to having them purged (due to their stronger mental defenses). These findings were 
replicated in a recent study by West et al., "Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind spot."  
Again, if our intelligence was evolved for Machiavellian ends, this sort of correlation would be expected. However, 
these self-manipulative abilities can also get out of hand. In Madness and Modernism, Sass argues that while 
typically described as a loss of rationality, schizophrenia is probably best understood as "hyperrationality." He 
argues that this over-rationality is symptomatic of modern culture and institutions, more broadly—leading to a 
host of social problems.  This is an important consideration we will be returning to throughout: more rational ≠ 
better.  
4  Objectivity is hopeless due to our inability to step out of our own minds—we cannot separate ourselves 
from our previous experience, antecedent beliefs, our cognitive and sensory limitations, our subconscious biases, 
our desires and aspirations, etc.  Our justifications will necessarily be informed by these. But it gets worse: in order 
to effectively adjust our thinking (to the extent that we can just choose to do so), we have to have some notion of 
the target we are aiming for. As we necessarily have absolutely no phenomenological experience of objectivity, it 
seems implausible that we could effectively calibrate ourselves in that direction, let alone evaluate progress 
towards the target. So even if objectivity were sensible (which it isn't), and we could adjust our cognition at will 
(we can't), we still would not be able to direct our cognition towards objectivity. At best, we can swap one bias for 
another.  
5  The "truth" or "falsity" of justifications is relevant only insofar as they are "falsifiable," and/or the cost of 
the justification being perceived as disingenuous is high. I have put the terms "facts," "truth," and "falsity" in scare 
quotes for reasons which will soon be explained. 
6  In defiance of the absolutism so prevalent in naïve discussions about “rationality,” logic is hardly 
monolithic. There are several, often incommensurate, modes/models of logic which could theoretically be applied 
in a given situation. These subtleties are explored robustly in Fetzer's "Evolution, Rationality, and Testability."  
Although not explored by Fetzer, among these interpretations are paraconsistent modes of logic, which 
comfortably subvert the "sacred" principle of non-contradiction.  
7  Despite the non-correlation between logic and rationality, it is not the case that anything goes. Norms 
and standards of rationality emerge in virtually all cultures/societies which help clarify what sorts of justifications 
are considered appropriate, etc. in that culture. The relationship between particular justifications and the 
contextual standards of rationality is analogous to the relation between jazz and "formal" music: flouting the 
rules/conventions only "works" because of the overwhelming levels of compliance.  
8  In virtually any context in any society, those who are good at manipulating people and navigating social 
environments are typically going to fare better than most. The upper-echelons of most institutions are populated 
by Machiavellians (of various stripes) rather than technocrats or veterans of the profession: people climb social 
ladders much faster (and much higher) through charisma and networking than by hard work or natural talent.  
9  It is the view of this author that logic’s “truth-preservative” guarantee is radically overstated. One could 
make such an assertion iff the world operated in a strictly-logical fashion. But this is not the case: our logic 
conforms to the universe (this is why we have so many counter-models and revisions over time), the universe does 
not conform to human logic.  So the "guarantee" of the logicians holds only insofar as their logical systems 
correctly reflect the way the world works. People used to understand this much better: in his, "How to Improve 
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Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction," Gigerenzer points out that the Enlightenment-era probabilists had long 
proceeded under the mandate of trying to codify how people actually thought (i.e. divining the "laws of the 
mind"). Accordingly, if a proposed rule seemed to defy our cognitive tendencies, that rule would be modified or 
tossed out.  In the intervening years, this dynamic has been reversed—rather than tailoring algorithms to the 
world (a descriptive project), the goal is to bring the world into compliance with the algorithms (a normative 
project).  Of these irreconcilable projects, the former seems much more viable—the latter, likely pernicious (Taleb, 
Bed of Procrustes).  
As a further complication for logic’s “truth-preservative” nature, it is important to note that the truth-
value of any proposition will not be an “objective fact.” Instead, it will be indexed to a number of pragmatic 
considerations as well as the relevant socio-cultural context—including but not limited to how certain concepts are 
framed, how a given context defines “knowledge” and which propositions have already received this designation.  
And this is only when the truth-value of a proposition is determinable at all. In many cases, the value will be mixed 
or altogether opaque. Accordingly, insofar as logical argument successfully preserves the “truth” of its constituent 
propositions, the “truth” being preserved far removed from the rationalists’ depictions.  
10  The "Machiavellian" nature of justification is merely representative of communication, more broadly: 
While we previously mentioned Grice's notion of Communicative Intent (i.e. language is used in order to convey 
something to the audience), we should also make note of the intent of communications (i.e. why someone is 
attempting to convey something at all). People communicate with others with purpose—typically to get others to 
believe/disbelieve in some proposition and/or to get others engage in/refrain from some course of action. Either 
feat is accomplished by altering another person’s understanding of reality, generally, so that it corresponds to that 
of the speaker, or serves the agenda of the speaker without reflecting his own beliefs (in the first case, the speaker 
would be telling the truth, in the latter case, “lying” in some form).  
This renders communication as necessarily biased and often exploitative: the speaker has a certain 
agenda for attempting to communicate, and that agenda is informed by the particular worldview and 
circumstances of the speaker. Facts are selected to be omitted or included to correspond to that worldview and 
circumstantial desire under the title, “relevance.” That is, we do not encounter language as detached and unbiased 
observers; instead, as participants with limited information, a number of biases, and a vested interest in the 
propositions with which we are presented and present. In all communications, objectivity, on the part of either the 
speaker or his audience, is impossible. Notice also that “honesty” and “dishonesty” is not indexed to “truth” and 
“falsity” but to whether or not the speaker is engaging with his audience in good faith—if the picture of the world 
he is promoting is commensurate with his own beliefs.  
11 To answer the question we began with, rationality is more basic than reasons, for what its worth.  
12  Introspective justification functions in much the same way as social ones: we typically rationalize our 
actions and beliefs to ourselves in times of internal conflict or self-doubt.   
13  What a party is demanding when they ask for justification is a compelling narrative by which they can 
understand a (typically adverse) state of affairs and/or formulate a proper response thereto. Again, the “truth” or 
“falsity” of these narratives is subordinate to their utility (insofar as their truth-values are even determinable)—
justifications are instrumental rather than epistemological. 
14  In these two examples there is a further parity between each culture's conception of rationality and 
democracy. In the case of Athens, democracy was a game for the social elites; the majority of people who lived 
under its jurisdiction were not "citizens." Accordingly, the conception of reason was elitist also: only a small 
minority were held to be capable of reason, and it was these people's job to orient society for the others.   
Conversely, during the "Enlightenment," despite the elitist realities of the institutions which emerged from the 
revolutions, they were animated by the ideology that freedom, justice, self-determination, etc. were the right of 
all. Accordingly, their conception of rationality was also universal (this trend was exacerbated by the influence of 
Christian eschatology).  
 The Metaphysics of Reasons 
"…the paradoxical character of self-deception flows from the idea, formalized by French polymath René Descartes 
in the 17th century, that human minds are transparent to their owners and that introspection yields an accurate 
understanding of our own mental life. As natural as this perspective is to most of us, it turns out to be deeply 
misguided.  If we hope to understand self-deception, we need to draw on a more scientifically sound conception of 
how the mind works. The brain comprises a number of functional systems. The system responsible for cognition — 
the thinking part of the brain — is somewhat distinct from the system that produces conscious experiences. The 
relation between the two systems can be thought of as similar to the relation between the processor and monitor of a 
personal computer. The work takes place in the processor; the monitor does nothing but display information the 
processor transfers to it. By the same token, the brain's cognitive systems do the thinking, whereas consciousness 
displays the information that it has received. Consciousness plays a less important role in cognition than previously 
expected." 
David L. Smith 
Natural Born Liars, "Fooling Ourselves" 
 
I. 
 If justifications do not refer to mental states, how should we understand the ordinary 
discourse regarding reasons and rationality, with their appeals to beliefs, desires, intentions, 
feelings, etc.?  Here, it may be helpful here to compare Folk Psychology to Folk Physics.  
 There is a sense in which we can articulate F. Psychology and/or F. Physics as systems of 
propositions and commitments, but such a rendering would bear little resemblance to how they 
actually operate. The folk conceptions are deployed automatically, instinctually: they inform 
how we, literally, perceive the world—they are hermeneutic devices for the data we receive. The 
folk conceptions are not theoretical; without the folk axioms, there are no theories.1  
 Our F. Psychology carries no ontological commitments to intentional states, any more 
than relying on F. Physics entails an ontological commitment to physical objects, causality, etc.  
Understood as a theory, F. Physics is false. Newtonian physics would undermine much of the 
folk, and modern fundamental physics would suggest that the folk and the Newtonian 
conceptions are deeply flawed. In spite of this, F. Physics remains indispensable.  
 Assume there was a car accident. A police officer arrives on the scene and asks a witness, 
"What happened here?" Now, imagine that witness responds by handing the officer a sheet of 
paper with some physics equations on it. This would be the most literally correct way of 
answering the question—indeed, there is a sense in which any other answer would be more or 
less misleading. But of course, this would not really be helpful to most (if any) police officers—
especially for such things as deciding who deserves blame for the incident, what the proper legal 
response should be, etc. Accordingly, it would not really be doing the work that "answering the 
question" is supposed to do. The "misleading" F. Physics answer is actually better than the 
"accurate" scientific/ mathematical answer (even sidestepping the difficulties in measuring the 
relevant data in real-time to make such an answer possible). There is nothing special about this 
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case: the "folk" answer will be superior in virtually all circumstances that most of us are faced 
with in our daily lives. 
 Rarely, if ever, in our normal routines is it really important/ useful to go beyond F. 
Physics. This is true even for specialists:  it is not important to deal with Quantum Theory if you 
are just trying to design a better jet—the Newtonian stuff works just fine.  For most of us, 
Newtonian physics is way more than we need to get by in the world; the folk is great. The 
"truth," such as it is, is not so critical—in fact, it can be a costly distraction (adequacy trumps 
accuracy).2   
 The purpose of F. Physics is not to provide profound insight into the ultimate nature of 
the physical universe—but to help us navigate said universe. Even if causality is, technically, 
problematic, and there are no physical objects3—acting as though these propositions are true is 
a virtual requirement for survival.4 We see the same in F. Psychology, which is oriented towards 




 Consider the following case:  
1. Kant is hungry6 
2. Kant eats 
 
Question: was hunger the reason Kant ate?  This seems difficult to affirm. Typically, we do not 
think, "I am hungry…what should I do about it? Should I eat?"  Nor, "I want to eat, how can it be 
justified? By my hunger?" 
 
 The relation between hunger and eating is not one of reasons.7 Nor is there a causal 
relation, per se. One can be hungry and not eat, even to the point of voluntarily starving to death. 
Conversely, one can eat without being hungry (this is, indeed, the American way). However, it 
seems ridiculous to claim that hunger and eating are independent; indeed, this is not my claim. 
Also, there should be little doubt that if asked, "Why did you eat?" Kant's reply would likely be, 
"I was hungry."  And given the premises of this example, that statement would be “true.”  
 This underscores the point: there is a relation between hunger and eating, but it is not one 
of reasons. There was no reason Kant ate until he was asked. Reasons do not exist 
independently;8 they are not something to be had or obtained. They are produced as needed, 
typically for the sake of others, typically in response to/anticipation of some kind of challenge or 
conflict.  
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 What we say by, "Jim has reason ψ to φ" is something akin to, "given what we know 
about this situation,9 we think Jim can justify φ by means of ψ, if necessary (i.e. ψ would, to us, 
be an acceptable justification for φ);" or, "If I were in his shoes, I would justify φ thusly." This 
justification may or may not line up with Jim's beliefs or the way Jim would try to explain his 
action, if pressed. And the justification may reflect the "actual situation" with more or less 
accuracy. But as to the question of what was the reason that Jim did φ—there simply is no fact to 
the matter.10  
1  In the introduction we explored how moral justifications should be understood in a similar manner as F. 
Physics and F. Psychology. While there is a sense in which morality can also be rendered into a system of 
propositions, etc.—such a picture seems to be out of touch with its phenomenology. In fact, it seems to be our F. 
Morality which grants credence to ethical theories, rather than vice-versa. We do not reason our way to moral 
behavior: morality is a part of our folk philosophy—it is a hermeneutic device for interpreting the world, it is prior 
to theory, and it is deployed instinctively in response to the contours of particular situations.   
2 Hertwig & Todd, "More is Not Always Better: the Benefits of Cognitive Limits."  
3 See Ross & Ladyman's "The Alleged Coupling-Constitution fallacy in the Mature Sciences," for a brief primer on 
contemporary fundamental physics, as relevant to this discussion.   
4  We can see here that the eliminativists are deeply misguided: although there may be little room for the 
folk conceptions in science (to include epistemology "proper")—this neither entails nor implies that they should be 
purged from broader society. In fact, this seems like a fairly ridiculous position to hold.  
5  Wittgenstein (in)famously argued that beliefs are not something "in the head;"  they merely denote 
dispositions to act a particular way in certain contexts. One's beliefs are defined by how one acts in the world, not 
by means of words (or therefore, conscious thoughts).  
6  For our purposes, we will sidestep considerations about what hunger is. The reader can define hunger as 
they like.  
7  To the extent that considerations are made, it is usually about what one should eat—it is taken for 
granted that eating will alleviate the hunger. 
8  It is unclear what the "independent existence" of reasons would mean ontologically, and there is certainly 
no evidence in support of such existence—in fact, as we have demonstrated, there is plenty of countervailing 
evidence. This has not prevented many philosophers from dogmatically positing reasons and principles as 
objectively "real."  
9  By indexing justifications to situations (as we do in "real life") we can make exceptions for ignorance, 
misinformation,  good intentions gone awry, or other mitigating circumstances, should we find it problematic that 
Jim did φ.  
10Clark & Toribio, "Doing without Representing?"  
                                                          
 Epistemology "Proper" (EP) 
"Believing what you read in a book on epistemology is like believing that the action on the stage of a theatre is all 
there is and that there are no people behind the scenes turning on the lights, changing colours, putting items where 
they are supposed to be, a jug, for example, or a telephone, ringing the telephone and bringing down the curtain." 
 
Paul Feyerabend 
The Tyranny of Science, p. 113 
 
I.  
 Epistemology has traditionally included two main projects. First, a descriptive study of 
how we know what we know, what is the nature of knowledge, belief, etc. Second, a normative 
component: given the above definitions, how should we think, what should we believe, etc.   
 Regarding the first project, in "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine argues that questions 
about our mental processes (how do we come to form beliefs? How do we allocate credence? 
How/why are beliefs changed? How do we make decisions? )—these will more properly fall in 
the domain of psychology, broadly construed. These questions are largely empirical, and cannot 
be answered from the armchair. To the extent that armchair work is done, its methods, axioms, 
and aims must be grounded in and/or constrained by contemporary scientific research. Our 
examination suggests that the study of justifications will be irrelevant to this project.  
 
II.  
 So long as epistemologists continue to focus primarily on reasons and justification, 
precisely what they will never be studying is how we actually think.  Instead, to examine 
rationality is to study how individuals mitigate differences with the broader societies they find 
themselves in (with implications for internal conflicts). This study may be of value, both 
descriptively and normatively—but calling it "epistemology" will be a misnomer. 
 Properly contextualized, the study of justifications will be a sociological/anthropological 
enterprise—accordingly, it will deploy radically different methodologies than those of classical 
epistemology. While will may be room for some meta-inquiry in this new discipline, the project 
will also be indexed largely to particular cultures and circumstances (given the contextual nature 
of rationality). The proper aims and methods of the discipline would become much clearer (and 
the study, accordingly, more fruitful), once practitioners accept justifications for what they are. A 
tentative step in this direction may be Zeruvabel's, Social Mindscapes: An Introduction to 
Cognitive Sociology.  
 Ameliorative Psychology (AP) 
"In the modern world, the most dangerous form of determinism is the technological phenomenon. It is not a question 
of getting rid of it, but, by an act of freedom, of transcending it…The first step in the quest, the first act of freedom, 
is to become aware of the necessity… by grasping the real nature of the technological phenomenon, and the extent 
to which it is robbing him of freedom, [man] confronts the blind mechanisms as a conscious being."  
Jacques Ellul 
The Technological Society, Introduction 
 
I.  
 Does good thinking = good outcomes? This has been a foundational assumption for 
analytic philosophy—but it is not the sort of claim that logicians can simply help themselves to; 
it is an empirical question. From the armchair, philosophers can conjure infinitely-many 
situations in which it would seem as though the assumption would hold—but it is far from clear 
what sort of relation these sparse hypotheticals have to the actual world, in all its messy richness. 
In fact, in the real world, with real people confronting actual problems in particular contexts in 
real time—this assumption fails with alarming regularity. Should we be concerned with 
improving outcomes in the actual situations we find ourselves in, the solution is not going to lie 
in (futilely) attempting to bring our cognition into line with logical standards.   
 However, accepting this does not entail abandoning the normative aspirations of 
epistemology. In the same way that the normative aspect of classical epistemology was 
contingent upon the descriptive—so, too, would EP have a normative component, based upon its 
descriptive component (psychology, broadly construed).  
 
II.  
 In their Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Bishop and Trout make a 
case for "Ameliorative Psychology" which applies the findings of EP in the "real world."  The 
authors focus primarily on the development of Statistical Prediction Rules (SPRs) which can 
consistently and dramatically outperform even seasoned experts at making identifications and 
predictions—while being far less demanding in terms of time and information.1 
 While there are some exceptional situations within a given context wherein experts have 
unique insight, or where the SPRs may fail to account for some critical variable, practitioners 
tend to be pretty bad at determining when they are in those cases. Specifically, practitioners tend 
to overestimate their own powers of judgment, and underestimate those of the model (the latter 
of which can usually be modified to account for blind spots, when detected). And so the best 
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course of action will typically be to dogmatically follow the verdict of the SPR's regardless of 
personal doubts or reservations.2  
 Beyond developing SPRs, our investigation has suggested other significant strategies:  
niche construction, data formatting, technologically extending our cognition, etc. Through these 
and other methods, we can play to our cognitive strengths while compensating for our 




 As the name implies, Ameliorative Psychology (AP) will be necessarily indexed to 
particular problems in particular contexts. Just as it is an ill-formed question, on our account, to 
ask whether or not people are rational—it will also be senseless to ask how we can improve our 
cognition generally. AP will develop tools and methods, effective in particular situations, in 
order to maximize particular outcomes. And this improvement, as Bishop and Trout point out, 
may or may not imply bringing our cognition into compliance with "logic," or increasing our 
introspection (in fact, generally, it will not).3  
 
IV.  
 There will be a number of constraints, as well.  First, practical: regarding SPR's, N.N. 
Taleb's The Black Swan helps to lay out the sort of situations where predictive modeling is not 
only ineffective, but malignant—particularly because it can instill undue confidence in people, 
causing them to expose themselves to unnecessary risk.   
 A Black Swan is an event which, relative to a given set of data or assumptions, seems 
extremely unlikely or even incomprehensible. Taleb sets out to demonstrate that it is Black 
Swans which are the primary driver of change in the world, birthed from what he calls “the 
Platonic Fold” (the resulting dissonance from when our tidy analytic concepts and projections 
are superimposed over the complex, messy, and volatile world we actually live in).   
In explaining B. Swans, Taleb draws a distinction between "Mediocristan" and 
"Extremistan;" B. Swans will be particularly influential in the latter. In Mediocristan, the level of 
variance is relatively small, such that any new data point will have little effect on the aggregate 
trend—to include B. Swan events. Accordingly, modeling and prediction are robustly reliable for 
the sorts of things which fall within this domain.   
However, modeling will be particularly ineffective and dangerous in what he calls "The 
Fourth Quadrant." In a nutshell, these are situations in which the inequalities/ variations among 
the phenomena in question are such that one single observation can profoundly and 
 Building on Nietzsche's Prelude | Musa al-Gharbi |32 
 
disproportionately impact the aggregate (i.e. "Extremistan")4—and when the potential risks and 
payoffs are complex or opaque.  In these situations, it is better to rely on no model at all; 
attempts to model or predict the 4th Quadrant tend to not only make us blind to B. Swans, they 
also tend to make us more fragile to them, should they occur.5  Similarly, regarding attempts to 
control events in this domain, because the risks and payoffs are often incalculably complex or 
opaque, there is an increased peril of unforeseeable blowback or iatrogenesis: attempting to 
manipulate 4th Quadrant phenomena to prevent B. Swans can actually make them more likely 
and more severe! Unfortunately, many situations we want to predict or control fall into this 
sector, to include the costs, duration and second-order effects of natural and man-made 
cataclysms (including wars), most economic trends and significant socio-cultural and/or political 
changes…    
 When we find ourselves in the 4th Quadrant, or otherwise faced with extraordinary/ novel 
situations for which our modeling will be of no use, sometimes our general-purpose cognition 
can help—but in other times, there simply is no good (epistemic) answer; reasoning, like 
modeling, can lead to the illusion of comprehension or control, instilling false confidence, and 
interfering with preparing and responding appropriately to the particular contours of fluid 
situations. But just because there is nothing which can be done epistemically in these 
circumstances does not mean there is nothing to be done: there are ways to reduce the quantity or 
quality of information necessary to flourish in the face of uncertainty. 
In general, one should aspire to robustness: minimizing exposure to catastrophic harm by 
testing for, and redressing, severe vulnerabilities in a system. But this is just a first step; 
robustness means "harder to break;" but usually, when robust things fail, the impact is profound. 
The goal, as he sees it, is to aim for antifragility.6 Antifragile entities benefit from occasional 
shocks, disorder, and chaos; the natural world is replete with examples—in fact, virtually all 
organic systems benefit from irregularities and stressors and atrophy without them. Some do 
extraordinarily well in extraordinary circumstances. According to the author, this is the target to 
aim for.  
 And so, after ensuring robustness, it may be prudent to partially expose oneself to risk in 
such a way that losses from Black Swan events which do not go "your way" may be severe, but 
not be ruinous; meanwhile, when such events do go as hoped, the payoffs can be enormous. In 
order to be maximally prepared to exploit these potentialities, one should aspire to be light, 
responsive, flexible, attentive, open-minded, ambitious/opportunistic, and stoic about risk and 
loss—knowing that a number of phenomena which will profoundly alter the course of one's life 
are going to be completely beyond comprehension or control. This sort of strategy will almost 
always pay off better than attempting (in vain) to plan, model, predict, or control the course of 
events in the 4th Quadrant.  In his Antifragile, Taleb explores, at length, how these conclusions 
can be applied to individuals, and especially, institutions.  
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 There is good news and bad news for the AP project. The good news is that modeling 
works great in "Mediocristan," and this domain includes most natural phenomena and many 
social phenomena, as well. Accordingly,  we can get a lot of mileage out of exploiting the 
regularity of this domain in order to develop SPRs or build a stable infrastructure for niche 
construction, data formatting, and extending our cognition. But the first important caveat for AP 
is that practitioners must constrain their efforts to this domain, under the knowledge that naïve 
interventions in the 4th Quadrant may well do more harm than good.  Second, the practitioners of 
AP must remember that chaos, disorder, unpredictability, stress, risk, inequality, and even 
occasional loss/failure—these are not de facto bad; in fact, they are healthy in moderation. 
Accordingly, the goal of AP should not be to minimize or eliminate them entirely, but merely to 
help curb their especially pernicious effects on especially vulnerable populations.  
 Minding this constraint has an additional benefit: tightly-regulated, massively 
interconnected, hyper-efficient, and extremely large systems are ill-advised; in the event that 
such institutions are hit with catastrophe (as all things eventually are), the effects tend to be 
much more severe, widespread, and prolonged. The impacts are often so traumatic that more 
harm than good can be generated, over the long term, through creating an institution of this 
sort—despite their enormous potential (which is, indeed, the source of their appeal).7 Systems 
and institutions should be designed such that they can fail with minimal contagion.  
 Finally, with the awareness that Black Swans are relative to particular frameworks and 
axioms, one way we can actually reduce their likelihood is going to be to reject epistemic rigidity 
or homogeneity in favor of promoting diverse interpretive strategies (of a given phenomenon or 
data-set), and robust good-faith conversations between the practitioners of these strategies.8  
 
V.  
“Whatever is not a condition of our life harms it: … "Virtue," "Duty," the "Good-in-Itself," the good which is 
impersonal and universally valid—chimeras and expressions of decline, of the final exhaustion of life… A people 
perishes when it confuses its duty with duty in general. Nothing ruins us more profoundly, more intimately, than 
every "impersonal" duty, every sacrifice to the Moloch of abstraction…" 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
The AntiChrist, p. 577 
 
 The second set of constraints will be ethical. In The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of 
Internet Freedom, Evengy Morozov demonstrates how "big data" (whose purpose is to develop 
SPRs) offers not only the possibility to improve human life, but also to hegemonize power, to 
exploit and manipulate people, to undermine privacy and freedom, etc. That is, in the wrong 
hands, the methods and tools of A. Psychology can be extremely pernicious. 
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 This distrust of paternalism should be particularly strong in those situations where the 
interests of the people designing and executing systems and/or policies diverge from the people 
most affected by them. Also, insofar as there are asymmetries in cost/risk for those designing and 
executing the systems/policies, compared to those for whom the policies were intended. In both 
cases, the greater this divergence, the greater the cause for prudence, vigilance, and at times, 
resistance.  
 In To Save Everything, Click Here, Morozov explores how, even if we assume 
developers/ policymakers to be generally well-intentioned, operating in institutions without 
perverse incentives, and deploying tools which are highly effective at their intended purpose 
(situations which would be rare, indeed)—there may still be important reasons related to human 
freedom, autonomy, dignity, privacy, etc. to limit the development, and especially the 
application, of these tools. To the extent that we attain a marginally higher standard of living at 
the expense of the challenges, effort, risks, opportunities, surprises, uncertainty, and personal 
engagement that make our lives worth living, the entire ameliorative project becomes self-
defeating.  
 Moreover, while technocrats can (and should) take the lead in determining the means of 
ameliorative projects, deciding what the ends of these efforts are cannot be left to elites. Instead, 
they should arise from public debate, with the programs themselves subject to public oversight—
and both the ends and means should be subject to revision as a result of this accountability. As 
we have seen, even the most educated individuals can be pretty bad at determining what their 
interests are and what they really want. Accordingly, it seems presumptuous for the intelligentsia 
to answer these questions for everyone else, believing that they can determine what’s good for an 
agent better than the agent himself (if one cannot even determine or predict one’s own wants and 
needs, how could they possibly make these determinations for others?). Again, the goal is to 
minimize asymmetries of costs/risks/ payoffs between the people designing and executing a 
given system, and those for whom the system is designed.  
These considerations are important due to the high likelihood of unintended 
consequences resultant from piecemeal interventions into complex and fluid systems— 
especially given the broad and elusive target of increasing human wellbeing and satisfaction.9 
Situations could easily arise wherein, despite every incremental step being an apparent 
improvement over the circumstance which immediately proceeded it, at some point we find 
ourselves worse-off than our initial position in some substantial way.10  
 
VI.  
 In, "The Rationality of Side Constraints," Nozick argues that when we sacrifice the 
interests of a particular person or group for the "greater good," these victims rarely actually 
receive much (if any) of the benefit achieved at their expense. The so-called "collective good" is 
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nothing more than an abstraction—the only "real" good is at the individual level, indexed to 
particular circumstances. It is meaningless to talk about an "overall benefit;" policies oriented 
towards this chimera merely provide for some at the expense of others. Accordingly, the primary 
purpose of social institutions should be to protect and maximize individual rights and freedom—
even with the best intentions, we should be hesitant to undermine these for the sake of some 
mythological "greater good."  
 
VIII.  
 The work of Taleb, Morozov and Nozick suggests boundaries of the AP project, and can 
help lend further definition to what "reformed epistemology" should look like—both at the 
practical and the normative levels. Of course, these considerations are only cursory; much more 
work can and must be done in this field. 
1  The superior performance of SPRs relative to experts has been robustly demonstrated across a wide 
spectrum of fields; the authors cite a host of studies in support of their claims. For an example which this author is 
personally familiar with, see "Clinical v. Actuarial Judgment," by Dawes et alia.   
2 Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, II.4: "The Tempting Pleasures of Broken Legs."  
3  Because AP primarily involves avoiding reflections/introspection in favor of dogmatically complying with 
SPR's or instinctually responding to cues built into the environment—this dramatically undermines the aims and 
methods of Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE).  
Over the course of their book (especially in Chapter 7, and the appendix), Bishop & Trout lay out a series 
of arguments which forcefully suggest there is simply no place for SAE in epistemology, at all. It is not a matter of 
incorporating some additional considerations from contemporary science—the discipline is just fundamentally and 
irrevocably futile.  So for those readers who find my own rather comprehensive arguments unsatisfactory, Bishop 
& Trout's case can serve as an excellent supplement.   
4  Some other attributes of "Extremistan" include (p. 36): extreme scalability of phenomena,  dominated by 
winner-take-all inequality, no physical constraints on the thresholds (often because they correspond to abstracta 
rather than physical qualities),  difficulty predicting from past information as the total will be determined by a 
small number of extreme events, it takes a while to understand what's going on, distribution is either 
Mandelbrotian (fractal; tractable scientifically) or wildly random-- as opposed to Gaussian bell curves, etc.  
5  Not only does modeling typically fail to anticipate B. Swans in the 4th Quadrant, but even when modeling 
does suggest the possibility of said events, it usually dramatically underestimates both their likelihood and their 
impact. But even if the modeling correctly attributes the likelihood of some event as remote: saying that the odds 
were 1: 10,000 is a cold comfort when that situation is upon us—especially in the event that one is ill-prepared for 
it. This is why robustness and antifragility are so important.  
6 N.N. Taleb, Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder 
7  The Black Swan problem is one of the primary flaws inherent in the Platonic vision of “Philosopher Kings” 
and its contemporary analog of having ivory-tower technocrats regulate and micromanage extremely large, 
complex and fluid systems and institutions in a top-down fashion. For other moral and philosophical arguments 
against these methods see Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies. 
8  Additional benefits of deliberative enclaves are explored in "Deliberative Democracy and Inequality: Two 
Cheers for Enclave Deliberation among the Disempowered," by Karpowitz et al.  Nozick presents an ethical case for 
promoting these enclaves in his Anarchy, State and Utopia.   
9  The central question which animates the discipline of ethics is, "how should I live my life?"—a question 
which can be rephrased as, "how can I live a fulfilling life?"  That is, "the good" towards which ethics strives is, 
ultimately, fulfillment.  
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This is the essential flaw of hedonistic accounts of morality (to include most Consequentialist models): 
pleasure is shallow and fleeting and does not answer this essential desire for fulfillment (eudaimonia). Very rarely 
do people on their deathbed look back on their lives and proclaim, "I wish I had more sex," or "I wish I ate more 
delicious food," or "I wish I spent more time on entertainment," or “I wish I had a nicer house,” etc. Instead, there 
are a number of sacraments, the pursuit of which brings meaning to life and tends to promote a lasting feeling of 
satisfaction/ happiness for most people, regardless of time or culture. Among them are: 
 
1. Making a change in the world; creating things (especially legacies which endure beyond oneself) 
2. Actualizing plans and aspirations (especially as a result of hard work) 
3. Overcoming pain, adversity, limitations, risk 
4. Building lasting, deep, and reciprocal relationships with friends, family, lovers, and the Divine 
5. Gaining a deeper knowledge of ourselves, the world, etc. 
Note that many of these are either altogether non-material, or only tangentially related to the material world (they 
play out more socially than physically)—moreover, they are unbounded: there is no point at which these 
sacraments are "completed."  "Progress" on each of these fronts is more a matter of subjective perception than 
objective fact.  
Finally, actually feeling happy/ fulfilled as a result of these pursuits is heavily dependent upon the 
individual in question. One can imagine a person who acknowledges great success in each of these sacraments, but 
for reasons ranging from biology to their general outlook on the world, remains unhappy and discontent (one can 
imagine the converse as well).  In short, "the good" is nebulous, elusive—it is neither abstract nor hedonistic; it is 
agent-relative. There is, and can be, no "alchemy of happiness." This is why decisions about the ends towards 
which the ameliorative project aspires cannot be taken for granted or dictated from the ivory tower.  
10  Morozov has additional concerns that these narrow solution-oriented approaches, while often effective, 
are also deeply conservative. Accordingly, while they may reduce the impact of certain problems, piecemeal 
approaches may also perpetuate problematic states of affairs—as compared to more radical measures (which also 
tend to be more expensive, difficult, controversial, and/or risky) with the potential to solve problems altogether, to 
push societies in exciting new directions, and to test the boundaries of our capacities.  
 Epistemic Pluralism & Defeasible Coherentism 
"Biologically considered, our minds are as ready to grind out falsehood as veracity, and he who says, "Better go 
without belief forever than believe a lie!" merely shows his own preponderant private horror of becoming a 
dupe…For my own part, I have also a horror of being duped; but I can believe that worse things than being duped 
may happen to a man in this world: so Clifford's exhortation has to my ears a thoroughly fantastic sound. It is like a 
general informing his soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle forever than to risk a single wound. Not so are 
victories over enemies or over nature gained. Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where 
we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this 
excessive nervousness on their behalf."  
William James 
The Will to Believe, VII 
 
I.  
 Having redefined epistemology in terms of psychology, there is still the question of 
defining knowledge. Our investigation suggests rather forcefully that any answer to this question 
must be indexed to particular cultures/ societies, as "truth" and "falsity" are themselves merely 
socio-linguistic functions, with no bearing on any objective reality.1  That said, the way 
knowledge is defined within a context is significant, affecting social conceptions of ethics, 
religion, philosophy, science, politics—there is virtually no sphere of human activity which is 
unaffected by how knowledge is defined. What follows are some cursory reflections on how our 
conclusions, if widely-adopted, might inform this cultural conception: 
 
II.  
 For the sake of argument, we can posit the existence of some singular and objective 
Reality— a Truth which in which we are all immersed, so to speak. However, we must also 
accept that we cannot perceive, reflect upon, or communicate this Truth in an objective and/or 
comprehensive fashion. Accordingly, the notion of objectivity becomes meaningless—we can 
have absolutely no conception of what the "objective reality" is like, other than the (safe) 
assumption that it would vary radically from our phenomenological experience.  Therefore, the 
primary value of objectivity (as a concept) would be in undermining our epistemic arrogance: 
whatever it is we think we know, however useful, well-substantiated or widely-adopted a given 
proposition happens to be, we certainly are not channeling objective truths. 
 Knowledge, therefore, concerns itself with beliefs, not facts.  The notion of "facts" 
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III.  
 Foundational to our beliefs must be some kind of ideology which informs how we 
interpret and evaluate the information we receive.3 We can call this hermeneutic device, 
"Proposition 0."  
  
This "proposition" will be tacit and largely unconscious; it need not be explicable (it 
typically won't be)—it is a basic disposition towards Reality, towards life, and towards other 
people.  The proposition is further refined in accordance with our life experiences; it is even 
possible to outright change this disposition—however, such a shift is difficult, and becomes 
increasingly less likely (barring some severe trauma) as we continue to build knowledge and 






 With these considerations in mind, we must reform our aspirations and expectations vis a 
vis knowledge. Rather than attaining the Truth (which is impossible), the emphasis should be on 
exploring the Truth.   
 Towards this end, given that human beings possess a number of faculties which track 
different types of information and respond to various cues, a more appropriate attitude to adopt 
towards knowledge will be one of epistemic pluralism. Our reflective processes should operate in 




 In addition to relying on multiple faculties, we must employ multiple methods of 
exploring the Truth, to include science, mathematics, religion, tradition, art, and direct personal 
experience. There is no inherent conflict in these methods8 should we abandon the 
Enlightenment-era idolatry of "Reason."   
 Of course, any particular question or idea may be more fruitfully explored with one 
method over another; but in all cases, we should place an emphasis on where these methods and 
their findings intersect with, verify, or complement one-another. These would be the truest 
truths, the best beliefs. 9    
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VI.  
 At the same time, we must bear in mind that our epistemic faculties are individually and 
collectively fallible.10 Should we become aware of contradictions (be they among multiple 
epistemic faculties, or between the conclusions of these faculties and our previously held 
beliefs), we should pay particular focus to them.  This is not necessarily to resolve these tensions; 
they may not be resolvable—however, these conflicts are usually indicative of some kind of 
human error/ limitation and/or a situation of extraordinary gravity/ profundity.11 In either case, 
greater attention is warranted.  
 We must also bear in mind that our epistemic faculties may be individually and 
collectively indecisive. Whenever our own epistemic faculties are insufficient to reach a 
conclusion in which we are confident, we should defer to a trusted authority, if possible. 
 
VII.  
 These tests of coherence12 would prima facie be the means of defining knowledge13 at the 
individual level:14  first, within our epistemic faculties, then comparing these findings with our 
established knowledge and overall worldview, and finally, with the consensus of others, as 
appropriate. 15  We can label this view Defeasible Coherentism.16  
 
VIII.   
 Within the framework of Defeasible Coherentism we can even salvage Clifford's attempt 
at linking epistemology to ethics:17 we should strive to ensure our words and actions are in 
keeping with our "knowledge." That is, we should be honest and genuine; we should live in 
"good faith"—even to the point of enduring risk or cost for the sake of upholding our doxastic 
commitments. This is the final, and perhaps most important, coherence test.18 
1  Even in scientific inquiry, “truth” & “falsity” are typically understood as socio-linguistic functions rather 
than objective realities: paradigms are adopted in favor of others because they seem to have the most explanatory 
power and development potential; these are utilitarian rather than epistemic concerns. Accordingly, we can see 
how it might be prudent to reform which propositions count as "true" or "false," dependent upon how useful the 
existing taxonomy is. In this way, we can explain why it may often be important to reconsider our “knowledge” 
without any appeal to "objective truth."  
2  Bruno Latour makes a similar distinction, arguing that the domain of knowledge is “matters of concern” 
rather than “matters of fact.”  He goes on to demonstrate how this distinction does not undermine, but instead 
affirms, science and empiricism. See, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of 
Concern.”  
3  It may be worth (empirically) exploring whether this hermeneutic device is the result of genetics, 
environment, or free choice. This author suspects this predisposition is informed, to various extents, by all three.  
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4 This is a subversion of Quine & Ullian's Web of Belief.  
5 By “experience,” we are referring to our memory and sense perception.  
6 By “instinct” we are referring to our tacit knowledge, aliefs, and heuristic judgments. 
7 By "convictions" we would mean, first and foremost, our Proposition 0 which informs judgments of valence, to 
include the overall telos of our lives. Religious beliefs would fall under this general category also.  
8  In, The Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Talal Asad demonstrates how prior to the 
rise of secularism, there was no robust notion of "religion" either. And as there were no "secular" and "religious" 
spheres, there was no conflict between "religion" and "science." Attempts to interpret history in terms of these 
contemporary secular frameworks are necessarily anachronistic.  These schisms are contingent, not necessary. 
9  While philosophers enjoy drawing clear lines between our "intellect" our "emotions," our "sense 
perception" etc., these categorizations do not tie out to our phenomenological experience. Consider sensory 
perception:  
 
When we see someone of the opposite sex, we immediately pass a judgment as to whether they are 
attractive or not (just as quickly as we recognize them as a human being and distinguish their gender—
both of which are conceptual distinctions).  It happens at the same moment as perception, and we are 
unable to suspend these judgments. Similarly, when presented with food, we do not merely observe what 
is on the plate, but immediately decide if it looks and/or smells appetizing (even recognizing/ designating 
something as “food” is a utilitarian judgment). When we eat the food, we do not objectively analyze the 
flavors; instead, based on the taste, smell, texture, etc. we decide if the food is pleasing or not. These are 
our first impressions, our most basic sensory experience—and it seems as though our initial encounter 
with any phenomena is colored by concepts and value judgments, which vary from person to person (or 
even within the same person in different circumstances).  
When we look around we do not see “the world as it is,” but rather “buildings,” “trees,” “people” (i.e. 
conceptual constructs)—try to look around and not see these things. 
 
We find a similar dynamic at play in our emotions: fear, for instance, has a certain physiological component, and an 
emotional component, but it also includes a very specific concept: that there is danger afoot. And emotions, much 
like our sense perceptions, track various data and respond to appropriate cues. In fact, it may be helpful to think of 
emotions as a social analog to sense perception. 
In any case, we see that our faculties are integrated to the point where it is senseless to talk of any one in 
isolation from the others. Those ideologies which rely upon these distinctions, pitting one faculty against the 
others—not only are they inaccurate and unhelpful, they are likely malignant. Consequently, they should be done 
away with.  
10  Note: This section concerns itself with defining positive knowledge, which can be a tricky affair, as much 
of what any generation considers knowledge will be substantially revised or altogether “falsified” by subsequent 
generations. A more reliable epistemic approach will often be to narrow the sphere of possible “right” answers by 
process of elimination—a sort of “negative epistemology.” That which is considered “knowledge” has a bad habit 
of being proved wrong. However, that which has been established as wrong tends to stay that way (although this is 
far from universal, it is a fairly reliable heuristic). But of course, this method, on its own, can only result in 
skepticism or aporia (although it also has the benefit of helping prevent foolish actions)—in order to really address 
the need to gain positive knowledge rather than merely avoiding misinformation, the via negative has to be 
combined with some affirmative methodology, such as Defeasible Coherentism.  
11  Accordingly, our primary method for challenging someone's beliefs would be by demonstrating internal 
incoherence between a particular claim they make and other beliefs they profess to hold or actions they engage in. 
12  These tests would be more passive than explicit. That is, we need not scroll through all of our beliefs in 
order to test for coherence (we couldn't if we wanted to), we should just be sensitive to conflicting messages—in 
these cases, we should do more rigorous examinations with our epistemic faculties, in pursuit of a more consistent 
conviction or a recognition of a true contradiction.  We may also want to actively seek this pluralistic affirmation 
when faced with new/unusual circumstances, or decisions of great importance.  
13  It must be emphasized that knowledge is importantly different from truth. The former is a utilitarian 
entity: a datum becomes knowledge insofar as it has some perceived value or use. Knowledge also carries social 
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implications: it is the sort of thing which can be transmitted from one person to another. For these reasons, 
knowledge is intrinsically distinct from any notion of "objective truth."  
14  In order to anticipate a potential objection, we should clarify the nature of coherence. Coherence is not 
exclusively the domain of logic; after all, conflict can occur independent of reason. Our emotions can be conflicted, 
our intuitions can pull in different directions, even our sense data can be contradictory. These would be possible 
even if we had no notions of "logic," "reason," or "paradoxes," and they could (and do) occur independent of 
conscious thought. So the pursuit of this coherence is not a strictly intellectual pursuit, and logical paradoxes are 
not our only (or even primary) concern in terms of our tests of integrity. 
15  Of course, beliefs may be coherent and "wrong," but this risk is inevitable with any system. As we have 
demonstrated, "objective" accounts are necessarily incoherent. Moreover, given the increased breadth of data 
which this system encourages us to consider, we may have reason to be much more confident in our conclusions 
should we have substantial agreement across faculties.  We should underscore again that the "rightness" of beliefs 
should be indexed, as in science, to pragmatic considerations rather than any notion of absolute "Truth." 
16  Defeasible Coherentism entails a commitment to an absurdist interpretation of empiricism: one looks to 
the external world to justify beliefs, relying on a host of external cues for validation. However, the D. Coherentist 
does not believe that this exercise yields “objective facts” or brings one closer to universal truths—instead, the 
goal is to  test a given belief’s reliability, utility, and resonance relative to our particular circumstances.  
17  In The Ethics of Belief, W.K. Clifford argued that to hold unjustified beliefs, and especially to act on those 
beliefs, is unethical because it can lead to "bad consequences." However,  a number of problems manifest 
themselves, almost immediately, in response to Clifford's arguments: In the first place, there is a distinction to be 
made between eliminating false beliefs and acquiring true beliefs. Clifford's methodologies emphasize the former 
without any clear description of how to go about the latter; his "sufficient proof," standard is completely 
ambiguous, and if the standard is set too high it would be impossible to hold any beliefs, at all.   
Many of our ordinary beliefs are not easily justifiable (if at all), to include a number of historical events, 
the laws of physics, etc. (i.e. it would be unreasonable to demand that we go out and “prove” the age of the 
universe in order to hold a view on it). Considering the sheer number of beliefs we hold, it would be impossible to 
explicitly justify many or even most of them.  And lacking "sufficient justification," people cannot simply remain in 
a state of aporia. Moreover, we are largely unaware of when and how we came to hold many of our beliefs; our 
narratives of belief-acquisition are often simply untrue, and unintentionally so. If we cannot even perform source-
monitoring well, how could we begin to execute Clifford's standard of examining and justifying each new belief? 
But source monitoring is just the tip of the iceberg; as we have examined, people do not have conscious access to a 
good deal of their mental contents:  our actions and attitudes are heavily informed by subconscious aliefs and 
heuristic cognitive processes to which we have no introspective access.  
And finally, the simple fact of the matter is that justified beliefs ≠ true beliefs—and this distinction is 
relevant only insofar as the "truth" or "falsity" of a belief is obvious or even determinable (for many beliefs, they 
will not be). We can see Clifford's view is totally incoherent without even considering the myriad flaws of 
consequentialism (which is supposed to give normative force to his conclusions)—although our investigation has 
also undermined his axiom that good thinking= good results.  
18  William Wainwright posits one’s actions as a means for justifying religious beliefs in his, Mysticism: A 
Study of Its Nature. But of course, this test of coherence has been traditionally affirmed in both "Athens" and 
"Jerusalem."  For elaboration, see Pierre Hadot's Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Excercises from Socrates to 
Foucault.  
 Ecce Homo 
“Descartes once said, ‘I think, therefore I am.’ He doubted everything but his own existence. And built his whole 
philosophy upon this doubt. A second statement was made by Gide, ‘I feel therefore I am,’ and a third by Camus, ‘I 
revolt, therefore I am.’ All these assertions are correct, but the most exalting becoming, peculiar to man, is referred 
to by Camus.” 
Ali Shariati 
Man & Islam, “Modern Man and His Prisons” 
 
I.  
 There is one important objection we should address in closing. The significance of the 
classical conception of rationality transcended epistemology—it was part of how generations of 
people (especially in Western societies, although by now, much of the world) have defined their 
"human" identity in contrast with the "lower" species; it was more than a description, it was a 
mandate, an ideal to aspire towards. And so we may wonder, isn't there some kind of teleological 
cost for abandoning this notion?  Simply put, our answer would be, "not really." There are 
several ways to press this case.   
 First, as demonstrated throughout, if we define rationality in terms of our reflective 
processes, it is a faculty we use sparingly, and often to our detriment (when we override the 
judgments of our other faculties). Insofar as this was our definitive quality, it would not speak 
well of us as a species.  But it turns out that it is not so definitive—animals exhibit many of the 
same capacities we had formerly believed to be exclusive.1 
 
II.  
 For the sake of argument, we can imagine that "rationality" was defined in terms of 
behaviors rather than reflective processes, explicit justifications, etc. This seems like the best 
method of evaluating rationality across species because, at the end of the day, behaviors are 
observable across species while cognitive processes and communications are largely opaque.  
 Under this model, we would call a creature "rational" to the extent that each of its 
behaviors (which expend an organism's resources) clearly and efficiently promoted the survival 
and/or reproduction of said entity or the group to which it belongs.2 Notice, under this 
conception it would still be an ill-formed question as to whether or not any particular entity was 
rational—instead, organisms would fall on a spectrum, relative to one another, based on 
efficiency.  
 Well, by this model, there would be essentially an inverse correlation between a species' 
level of rationality and its place in the "pyramid of being."  The most rational species would be 
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near the bottom of the "evolutionary chain:" creatures like bacteria, ants and bees which are 
extremely efficient, spending almost the entirety of their energy on promoting the survival and 
reproduction of themselves or their colonies.  
 The higher one travels up the evolutionary chain, the less "purely rational" organisms 
seem to be— in fact, rather than rationality being a mark of a "higher-order" being, it seems as 
though the capacity to emote is a better indicator of more sophisticated species.  As we proceed 
further, there is an increased prevalence of "playful" behavior, especially among the young. 
Intergroup tensions, waste, and even nihilistic behavior also become increasingly frequent and 
increasingly pronounced. At the pinnacle of these sorts of behaviors would be human beings: 
possibly the least rational creatures to have ever graced this planet.   
 
III.  
While rationalists have, from the beginning of their movement, been willing to concede 
that people are "imperfectly rational," that our reflection is constrained by our physical frailties 
and hampered by misinformation, disinformation and ignorance—these concessions have proven 
woefully insufficient. Our survey has demonstrated that, across the spectrum of human 
judgment, the way people actually think seems to confound in their entirety theories of "rational 
choice," or "rational deliberation:"  
 We have little introspective access to our desires, wants, and needs; we are typically 
wrong about what will make us happy, about how happy it will make us and for how long.3 We 
confabulate stories about our mental states in order to explain our actions—both to ourselves and 
others. We do not act on reasons, but instead produce them when useful for justifying ourselves. 
Our intuitions are wildly unstable from person to person—and for any given person across time 
and circumstances. Accordingly, we are unable to rank or weigh our preferences other than in a 
shallow and capricious fashion. And even if we sidestep these grave concerns, we have a number 
of priorities which supersede and supervene upon our “expected utility” calculus.4   
In light of these considerations, it would likely be more effective to abandon altogether 
the notion of human beings as "rational agents" in favor of a more plausible conception. 5  
 
IV.  
 If we return to the idea that some cognitive ability of mankind sets us apart from the rest 
of creation, another (perhaps, more compelling) candidate is the ability to deny reality: to believe 
in things for which one has little evidence (or even in defiance of countervailing evidence), to 
create elaborate fictions, to evaluate counter-factual scenarios, to plan or hope for possible 
futures and to idealize the past.  
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 In fact, distancing oneself from the "actual" is the very ability which allows for abstract 
thinking in the first place—a phenomenon which Sterelny6 calls "Decoupled Representation." 
While this capability is not exclusive to humans, humans seem to be unique insofar as we exhibit 
tendencies to outright deny or ignore the actual in favor of the symbolic.  Insofar as this is what 
makes us "human," our exemplar should not be Plato, but Don Quixote de la Mancha.   
From this perspective, 7 man would be a "surreal animal," or an "imaginative animal," 
rather than a "rational animal."  The popular adoption of this conception would also have 
profound implications for the identity, telos, and trajectory of our species.   
 
1  For an overview of this literature, see Rational Animals? (ed. Hurley & Nudds).  
One implication of the research seems to be that the entire "pyramid of being" concept is misguided, and should 
probably be abandoned altogether.  
2  This is also more-or-less the definition of rationality that underlies game-theory. It is a scandal of the 
discipline that, despite the assumption of this efficiency as people's "default setting" for purposes of virtually all 
modeling and prediction—people hardly ever act in accordance with these assumptions when the experiments are 
run with actual subjects. Accordingly, it should not be surprising that GT has a rather horrendous prediction record. 
First, because of the "Black Swan" problem, present in many of the trends modelers want to map (a problem 
nearly-exclusive to human social contexts)—and second, because people often have a host of other concerns 
which supersede and supervene expected utility calculations. Finally, even were they primarily interested in 
maximizing a given outcome, human "reasoning" is robustly influenced by a host of biases, etc. 
The supposed credibility of GT and its cousin Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is derived almost entirely from 
post-hoc analyses of historical events—analyses which can be conveniently spun regardless of what course of 
events ultimately occurs; accordingly, GT serves mostly to "explain" the status quo rather than to provide insight 
into fluid situations or to predict the future. For these reasons, even prominent game-theorists have come to 
admit that the method has negligible "real-world" utility, and that reliance upon the method for making 
predictions about actual situations is likely to do more harm than good (insofar as it obscures more effective 
analytic frameworks or is used to lend credibility to terrible policies). 
All of this is further evidence that people are not "supremely rational" compared to other animals (it also 
vindicates our choice to ground E. Psychology in C. Theory over G. Theory). This non-rationality should be 
understood as an asset rather than a problem: a "perfectly rational" human being (as conceived by game theorists) 
would be, essentially, a sociopath. This seems like a perverse ideal to aspire towards.   
 
For elaboration see:  
Dubner et al.,  "The Folly of Prediction"; Mandel, "A Nobel Letdown in Economics";  Martin, "The Selective 
Usefulness of Game Theory";  Ronson, The Psychopath Test;  Rubinstein, "Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist";  
Stone, "The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in International Relations."   
3 Gertner, “The Futile Pursuit of Happiness” 
4  People do not seek to “maximize” their share of so-called primary goods: there is such a thing as too 
much freedom, too much responsibility, too many choices/opportunities; it can be onerous when society places 
too much value on an individual; wealth has diminishing margins of utility vis a vis happiness; rapid rises in success 
can even adversely affect one's happiness. These facts call into question not only many essential axioms of game 
theory, but also liberalism.  
 
For elaboration see:  
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Kucera, "Voting Against Freedom;" Hedges, "The Surprising Poverty of Too Many Choices;" Tugend, "Too Many 
Choices: A Problem that can Paralyze;" Easterlin, "Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income? Cavaet Emptor" & 
"When Growth Outpaces Happiness;" Kahneman & Deaton, "High income improves evaluation of life but not 
emotional well-being;" Graham & Pettinato, "Frustrated Achievers: Winners, Losers, and Subjective Well-Being in 
New Market Economies;" Markus & Schwartz, "Does Choice Mean Freedom and Well-Being?"  
5 Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational  
6Sterelny,  Thought in a Hostile World 
7  Accordingly, our position at the top of the food chain despite, or maybe because of, our quixotic nature –
this is a rather poignant statement on the importance of "truth," "reality," etc. (the ostensive target of classical 
epistemology). 
 HOW THE “TRUE WORLD” FINALLY BECAME A FABLE 
The History of an Error 
 
1. The true world—attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it.  
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A 
circumlocution for the sentence, “I, Plato, am the truth.”) 
2. The true world—unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous 
man.  
(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible—it becomes 
female, it becomes Christian.) 
3. The true world—unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it—
a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. 
(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become 
elusive, pale, Nordic, Kantian.) 
4. The true world—unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also 
unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something 
unknown obligate us? 
(Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.) 
5. The “true” world—an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating—an 
idea which has become useless and superfluous—consequently, a refuted idea: let us 
abolish it! 
(Bright day; breakfast; return of bons sens and cheerfulness; Plato’s embarrassed blush; 
pandemonium of all free spirits.) 
6. The true world—we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one 
perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.  
(Noon; the moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of 




Twilight of the Idols: Or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer 
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Appendix I: Postscript on Fundamentalism 
“What unity do we find in these various aspects of bad faith? It is a certain art of forming contradictory concepts 
which unite in themselves both an idea and the negation of that idea... Bad faith apprehends evidence but is resigned 
in advance to not being fulfilled by this evidence, to not being persuaded and transformed into good faith… Let us 
understand clearly that there is no question of a reflective, voluntary decision, but of a spontaneous determination in 
our being. One puts oneself in bad faith as one goes to sleep, and one is in bad faith as one dreams. Once this mode 
of being has been realized, it is as difficult to get out of it as to wake oneself up; bad faith is a type of being in the 
world, like waking or dreaming, which by itself tends to perpetuate itself, although its structure is of the metastable 
type. But bad faith is conscious of its structure, and it has taken precautions by deciding that the metastable structure 
is the structure of being and that non-persuasion is the structure of all convictions." 
Jean-Paul Sarte  
Being and Nothingness, p. 98, 113 
 
I.  
 Fundamentalism is not exclusively, or even primarily, a religious phenomenon: it is the 
result of interpreting reality through an ideological lens. Our investigation has previously 
suggested that, at bottom, all of us understand the world ideologically: there must be some 
unsubstantiated axiom which serves to anchor and orient our knowledge, etc. That is, we all fall 
somewhere on the “fundamentalism spectrum.”  
 However, the fundamentalist’s relation to his ideology is explicit and volitional (as 
opposed to tacit and instinctual). Accordingly, ideology plays a much more significant 
hermeneutic and justificatory role to the fundamentalist, to include often sanctioning beliefs and 
actions which fall far outside their socio-cultural “mainstream.”  It is not that fundamentalists are 
more “ideological” while most people are more “rational”—the preceding investigation shows 
that such a dichotomy is profoundly erroneous. Instead, fundamentalists are more self-aware of 
their doxastic commitments as compared to the general population;1 and they are more devoted 
to instantiating their ideologies through their actions and “in the world.”  
While most people are driven by a host of ideologies, often conflicting, whose relative 
significance fluctuates over time and according to circumstance—the ideological commitments 
of fundamentalists are much more stable.  
 
II. 
Whether these traits promote or degrade fitness will have wide contextual variance. For 
instance, fundamentalists and their ideologies typically flourish during periods of crisis/ 
cataclysm or severe unrest/uncertainty, even as their “establishment” detractors perish. 
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Fundamentalists are antifragile; however, like all antifragile entities, they atrophy in the absence 
of sufficient stressors. This is one reason why so many fundamentalist movements blossom 
under persecution and whither upon being institutionalized. Imperialism (of various stripes) is 
one way to prolong this decline by perpetuating the volatility which fundamentalists thrive on.  
 
III. 
Despite their pretense as counter-ideologies, secularism and rationalism are no less 
ideological than Islamism, Marxism, nationalism, or any other “ism.” As the preceding 
examination makes clear, rationalism is a dogma which could only be accepted in defiance of 
virtually all existent scientific evidence on psychology and human cognition. There is an irony 
here: Rationalists are among the most fanatical advocates of “science” as an alternative to 
“faith.” And yet these very zealots are largely ignorant of its findings, aims, methods and 
history—even as it relates to rationality itself. In this, they are much like the Christians who hold 
up the Bible as the ultimate criterion of Truth, but who are generally ignorant of what it says, let 
alone the proper socio-cultural, historical, linguistic and other frameworks which would enable 
one to properly interpret the scriptures. There is little distinguishing the rationalist from the 
religious zealot:  
We have previously explored the religious origins of rationalism, along with the 
fanaticism which ushered in the “Enlightenment.” We have explored how the notion of “truth” 
deployed by rationalists and “scientifists” is thoroughly unscientific (i.e. Truth as objective, 
universal, eternal; Truth as intrinsically valuable and morally, rather than merely pragmatically, 
normative)—in fact, it is religious to the core…specifically evocative of monotheism.   
 
IV. 
 Consider the rationalists’ obsession with justification and proofs—it is driven by the 
thoroughly religious conviction that everything happens “for a reason.” We have shown that 
these sorts of people are typically confused about what “reasons” are and how they function 
(reasons are not causes)—but this is hardly the extent of their error: they also typically confuse 
catalysts for causes and conflate correlations with causation. Fundamentalists have a “causality” 
problem which enables (and often motivates) their interpretations of the world. 
 
V.  
From a non-religious vantage point, events have no meaning apart from that which 
human beings impart to them. Accordingly, evolution is about change not progress: Imagine a 
line that is infinitely long. From any point on that line, one could travel in any direction for any 
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span of distance and one would be no closer to reaching the end-point, which would forever 
remain infinitely-far away. Accordingly, no matter how far or how long one travelled in a given 
direction, it would be senseless to talk about “progress.” This is because implicitly or explicitly, 
“progress” must always be indexed to some presupposed end-state.2  
It is inappropriate to speak of “progress” in science, technology, philosophy, socio-
cultural arrangements, etc. In these cases, “progress” is always an aesthetic judgment3 and never 
an empirical “fact.” Interpreting evolution as “progress” is a hallmark of fundamentalism—and 
not only (or even primarily) of the religious variety. 
 
VI. 
Religious fundamentalists typically have an eschatological vision which culminates with 
the inevitable triumph of their ideology over all incompatible counter-models--ushering in an age 
of unprecedented peace and prosperity. This determinism is just as prevalent in ideologies like 
secularism, rationalism, liberalism, communism, humanism, and atheism—with all of their 
evocations of “progress” and exuberant visions of the inevitable trajectory of history.4 
Ultimately, these secular utopian visions are about as well-substantiated as those of their 
religious counterparts, and by the same means: through selecting and interpreting empirical 
evidence in “bad faith.”  
It deserves to be repeated that, rather obviously, these eschatological projections have 
never come to pass--except in the most vague or superficial senses conceivable.5  But this is 
sufficient for the fundamentalist, whose ideologies (whether secular or religious) are self-
justifying, and predictions, self-fulfilling.   
 
VII. 
 Fundamentalism is a feature of human societies—one which cannot, and probably should 
not, be purged. Fundamentalists seem to play an important role in helping make sense of, and 
respond to, crises—in giving societies a vision and sense of purpose, in helping to drive social 
changes. Nonetheless, we can strive to contain the adverse effects of fundamentalism in those 
contexts where it is pernicious (just as fundamentalists can be central in organizing people to 
respond to calamities—if left unchecked, they can also bring them about or make things worse). 
Central to this endeavor will be ceasing to understand fundamentalism as an exclusively, or even 
primarily, religious phenomenon in order to better identify instances which are far more 
widespread and dangerous in contemporary systems and institutions. 
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1  In his, "Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing," Cass R. Sunstein approaches the striking consistency 
between morality and cognition from an evolutionary standpoint. However, his analysis is plagued with same false 
assumptions as ethical theorists— among them, the assumption that moral facts are items which are amenable to 
rational criticism. That is, he takes for granted that moral positions can, and should, be rationally justifiable or 
falsifiable, and that logical inconsistency is problematic for a moral system.  As he is approaching these issues from 
an evolutionary perspective, it should have been clear that this sentiment is a relatively new development in the 
discipline of ethics:  
 
Traditionally, morality was decided by the decree of religious prophets or ruling kings— in these systems, 
it would be perverse for the prophet or the king to attempt to justify decrees to the plebeians; the role of the 
lower classes was merely to execute these demands. Logic only touched upon morality in order to draw inferences 
from cases where the law was explicit to cases which were not covered, or to help settle questions of priority in 
the case of conflicting obligations (at the institutional level).  
Similarly, Sunstein seems to suggest that moral decisions can be decided as "good" or "bad" based upon their 
outcomes/ consequences. This is also a relatively new development in moral theory. Again, the traditional moral 
view was that compliance with the Law was the definition of morality— to incur negative results upon oneself in 
order to ensure such compliance was understood as a noble act. The refrain was, "Let justice be done, though the 
heavens might fall!" People were called upon to face fortune and adversity with equanimity.  
In short, the unwavering adherence to the Law was not, as Sunstein portrays it, a mere shortcut for 
avoiding critical thought. Instead, this compliance was the definition of ethical behavior—to be fulfilled regardless 
of our pragmatic reservations or independent judgment.  It is not as though these historical adherents did not 
come to their own conclusions, they merely subordinated their own convictions to the Law, often through heroic 
acts of will and great sacrifice to themselves. That is, the path of compliance was not the choice of laziness or 
convenience—quite the reverse. In fact, given the self-serving nature of rationality, it is likely that the 
interpretation of ethics Sunstein is advocating would better facilitate moral laziness: there is no need to act 
according to one’s moral convictions if shortcomings can be absolved by simply come up with a justification for 
akrasia. As we have seen, rather than being paragons of virtue, ethicists are among the worst offenders in this 
regard. 
2  Mutatis mutandis, the linear refutation of progress would apply equally to one’s trajectory on a circular 
path or in a cyclical process. That is, no matter how one understands the “flow of history,” absent a distinct end-
state, the notion of progress is vacuous.  
3  “Progress” connotes improvement—however, neither increased complexity nor novelty entail 
betterment. Whether one is talking about entrepreneurship, medicine, technologies or ideas--most attempts at 
innovation fail, often catastrophically, or produce otherwise negligible effects. Insofar as a change proves 
significantly useful, it is often not in the way intended by its progenitors, and the added benefit to some usually 
entails significant costs to others. The outcome of interfering in complex systems will always be difficult to predict 
or control. Many of the effects, and especially the 2nd-order effects of a change, will not manifest themselves until 
much later—and they typically turn out much different than anticipated. So those who herald such an intervention 
as “progress” shortly after it is carried out (or especially before) are making claims about things they could not 
possibly have knowledge on. In philosophy circles, this sort of rhetoric is known as “bullshit” (Frankfurt, On 
Bullshit).  
Even sidestepping the first epistemological problem—there is simply no objective measure for “better” or 
“worse” in any of these fields. Typically these transformations carry tradeoffs, which again, are rarely apparent or 
well-understood beforehand. And how one ultimately evaluates the phenomenon in question will be largely 
determined by who is doing the measuring, when and in what context, what they find to be the appropriate 
metrics of evaluation, and the specific means used to collect the relevant data. And these criteria virtually always 
conceal a number of controversial biases—often by design. 
4 Derrida, Specters of Marx. 
5 Popper, The Poverty of Historicism. 
                                                          
 Appendix II: Postscript on Ethics 
"What then becomes of this category (ethics) if we claim to suppress, or mask, its religious character, all the while 
preserving the abstract arrangement of its apparent constitution? …We are left with a pious discourse without piety, 
a spiritual supplement for incompetent governments, and a cultural sociology preached, in line with the new-style 
sermons, in lieu of the late class struggle. Our suspicions are first aroused when we see that the apostles of ethics 
and the 'right to difference' are clearly horrified by any vigorously sustained difference. For them, African customs 
are barbaric, Muslims are dreadful, the Chinese are totalitarian, and so on.  As a matter of fact, this celebrated 'other' 
is acceptable only if he is a good other—which is to say what, exactly, if not the same as us?  Respect for 
differences, of course! But on condition that the different be parliamentary-democratic, pro free-market economics, 
in favor of freedom of opinion, feminism, the environment…It might well be that ethical ideology, detached from 
religious teachings which at least conferred upon it the fullness of a ‘revealed’ identity, is simply the final 
imperative of a conquering civilization: 'Become like me and I will respect your difference.'" 
Alain Badiou 
Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, 2: IV 
 
 So long as the process of ethical decision-making is understood as being in some way 
essentially rational, it is inevitable that ethicists will continue appealing to theory in order to 
define morality.  In the preceding, we have attempted to cast doubt upon this rationality; 
however, in order to avoid the "is implies ought" fallacy,1 we must address the long-overdue 
question, "(why) should ethics be rational?"  Given that the default moral decision-making 
process seems to be atheoretical and non-rational, it falls to the rationalists to demonstrate why 
we should override it.  
 Plato's response to this challenge2 was to deliver rational arguments (as was Kant's, and a 
number of others')—but of course, this move is impermissible: it begs the question. We could 
imagine asking an intuitionist why it is that our intuitions are the best guide and have him 
respond, "it just feels right;" or, we could ask a divine-mandate anti-theorist why the scriptures 
should be the criterion for morality and have him respond, "because the Scriptures claim to be 
just this criterion— and they are infallible;" believing that power was the criterion for rightness, 
perchance Thrsymachus should have challenged Socrates to a duel in order to determine the 
definition of Justice. Of course, all of these methods are absurd3—the rationalist needs to appeal 
to something other than logical arguments to prove his point.  
 One tempting move may be to appeal to consequentialism: we are more likely to do the 
“right” thing if we act reflectively and/or on principle. However, our investigation has already 
precluded this appeal: in many cases, we actually perform better when we rely on heuristics over 
deliberation, on instinctual responses to particular contexts rather than on abstracta—especially 
if we are working with extremely limited information, if we are faced with an extremely complex 
problem, or if we need to respond quickly to a fluid situation.  In these and other cases, rational 
deliberation can create more problems than it solves; morality seems to work in much the same 
way as other forms of judgment.   
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 Accordingly, we seem to have discredited the supposed rationality of moral judgment on 
both the descriptive and normative levels, rendering the very notion of "ethical theory" 
incoherent in relation to individuals.  
 
II. 
 We may be able to recover the discipline of ethics by reforming our understanding of 
Reason. Again, contemporary findings of cognitive science and evolutionary psychology suggest 
that the primary purpose of our rational faculties is to manipulate other people.  And as we have 
previously explored, despite pretenses of objectivity, ostensive commitments to analysis over 
rhetoric, and our remarkable scientific and technological advances—social manipulation remains 
the primary use to which we dedicate our rational faculties, while our problem-solving and 
decision-making remains overwhelmingly non-reflective. The primary function "reasons" serve 
is in justifying our actions retroactively—typically in response to, or expectation of, some kind 
of interpersonal dispute.  In light of these propositions, ethical theory may have some relevance 
at the institutional level for mitigating disagreements or conflicting interests:  
 
Ethics v. Morality 
Should we regard institutions (rather than individuals) as ethical agents, we may be able 
to salvage the discipline. However its aims and methods would be dramatically changed:  
 For instance, while many individuals struggle with their raison d'être, the telos of 
institutions is relatively simple and unambiguous: institutions are created for specific purposes. 
And so, although ethics would be (more-or-less) an institutional analog to morality, the 
existential differences between the relevant agents would prevent ethics from being simply 
reduced into morality (or derived therefrom). Consider the case of the law (the primary arbiter of 
social conflicts and enforcer of ethical norms)—the primary purpose of our legal codes is not to 
produce a moral society, but a stable and prosperous one;4 accordingly, we must divorce the 
Law from the pretense of morality.5 Under analysis, a similar dynamic plays out across the 
virtual entirety of social institutions.  
 Accordingly, while ethics obviously has moral dimensions, the discipline will be more of 
a technocratic than a philosophical enterprise; the answers to questions such as "what is good?" 
(or “right" or "just") will be derived from ethical agents themselves and the contexts they find 
themselves in. This, in turn, would render the discipline less ideal/ abstract, and more 
practical/pragmatic. Moreover, because the teleology of institutions is indexed to particular 
outcomes, ethics would trend towards consequentialism in the formulation and evaluation of 
ethical practices.   
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 Ethical debates would turn primarily on questions of policy,6 indexed to particular 
problems in particular social contexts in light of particular desired outcomes.  That is, relative to 
a particular society or culture, we would be able to speak coherently of business ethics, medical 
ethics, legal ethics, environmental ethics, of the ethics of science, of journalism, etc.— relative to 
a number of ethical agents,7 their interactions with one-another, with the public-at-large, and 
with the environment. It would be difficult to talk about a field of "general ethics," with 
grandiose theories which applied to any and all ethical agents in any and all circumstances.8 Talk 
of a field of "personal ethics" would be recognized as just that (talk), and little more; the actions 




 A significant advantage of this reformulation is that, at the institutional level, the 
discipline of ethics would actually have salience.  As we have explored, ethical theory has very 
little relevance in our personal lives: we do not use ethical theories in making moral judgments—
and even if we wanted to, they all offer roughly the same advice in most “real-world” contexts 
individuals find themselves in. 
 
The Value of Theory 
 There is a much cleaner translation of ethical theory into institutional behavior. This is 
because, in the same way that humans act primarily through their non-reflective systems, 
institutional volition is expressed primarily through policy. The job of people working in or for 
an institution is primarily to figure out how to best execute these policies in specific situations. 
Therefore, insofar as ethical considerations are written into policies, they can affect institutional 
behavior far more effectively than any abstract ethical system can affect the behaviors of 
individuals.  
 The situations with which institutions are faced more closely resemble the "hypothetical 
cases," so heavily relied upon in ethical theory. Institutional policy decisions are also much more 
deliberative, often involving committees rather than individuals, with a number of reviews, 
checks, and balances on the decision-making process. Typically this process relies heavily on 
case-studies, legal precedents, projections, etc. in making their decisions. That is, there is a 
clearer utility in analyzing specific cases—be they actual or hypothetical.  Moreover, institutions 
typically do have measurable outcomes (based on specific, relevant criteria), complete with tools 
and methodologies to measure those outcomes, and compare them to previous performance and 
projected results.  
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 For better or worse, institutions are much more "rational" than individuals.9 This is partly 
because institutions typically concern themselves with a very narrow scope of operations and 
activities (allowing them to develop consistent strategies across multiple transactions)--
augmented through automating decision-making through various actuarial models, computer 
projections, etc. (although, as with individuals, overreliance upon these models, especially in 
inappropriate domains, can blind agents to critical information).  These factors, unfortunately, 
can also give rise to perverse incentives, as well as malignant institutional strategies to realize 
those incentives with maximal effectiveness and efficiency. This is why the discipline of ethics 
remains so important at the institutional level, despite its essential irrelevance in the personal 
domain: ironically, to constrain the internal logic of institutions. 
 
II.  
 While a reformation such as the one proposed here would necessarily invalidate the bulk 
of what has hitherto been understood as "ethics," the benefits would greatly outweigh the "cost." 
Policies are enforceable in a way which individual morality is not—and the scope and influence 
of institutions and their actions are generally far greater than those of individuals. As a result of 
the larger scope of institutions and their greater ability to enforce normative policies on 
themselves and upon others—policies shape not only institutional behavior, but individual 
behavior as well.10  Major social normative changes, as a matter of fact, are typically top-down 
rather than bottom-up.11 Accordingly, by understanding institutions as ethical agents and 
restructuring the field accordingly, the discipline would cease to be essentially an intellectual 
sport for the ivory tower,12 and would instead become a field of study that matters in the real 
world and changes people's lives…God willing, for the better.
1  A rationalist could reply that, although it seems we typically do not use reason in making moral decisions, 
we should.  
2 Plato, Republic: 582 d-e  
3  While question-begging responses would be illogical for any party, it is a much bigger violation for the 
rationalist—after all, the intuitionist, religious ethicist, and "might-makes-right" adherents have not made any 
commitments to logic being a criterion for Truth—the rationalist has. In a sense, it would actually be permissible 
(within their axiomatic frameworks) for these others to commit logical violations, insofar as they do not believe 
themselves to be necessarily beholden to logic. For the rationalist, however, it would be totally impermissible.  
4  This aspiration of the legal system (to promote a stable and prosperous society) ties out to the essential 
purpose of government more broadly: to promote the security, welfare, and freedoms of its citizenry (in 
apparently descending order of importance). 
5  While it may seem controversial to claim that the law should be divorced from morality, the assertion 
actually ties out cleanly to the truism that legal ≠ right. 
6  Accordingly, on our conception, the job of ethicists would be to develop policies to address particularly 
pernicious effects of institutional operation in particular contexts.  
7  Again, ethical agents would be institutions, as opposed to moral agents, who would be individuals.   
8  There may be room for some defeasible practical constraints which can be built into the ethical project, 
much along the lines discussed previously with regards to A. Psychology.  
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9  Here we are referring to the G. Theory notion of rationality, which is totally appropriate for institutions 
considering that (unlike people) they are created to achieve specific ends and are intrinsically amoral. 
10  This assertion dates back to the very foundations of ethics (and philosophy, more broadly): it was one of 
the major subthemes of Plato's Republic. Although Plato himself was an avowed rationalist (viewing Logos in a 
religious manner), and while he believed that people were essentially rational, he was quick to acknowledge that 
people are not primarily rational, nor will they ever be. Instead, he drew repeated analogies between the 
institutions of a city and the ethos of its inhabitants, insisting that the only way to ensure a stable and prosperous 
society would be to legislate rationality into the State itself (although he held that even this project would be 
doomed to eventual decline and collapse due to humanity's overwhelming irrationality).  In short, the discipline of 
ethics was founded on the notion that individuals could not be expected to utilize rational theories in their moral 
judgments.  
11 DL Kincaid, "From Innovation to Social Norm: Bounded Normative Influence."  
Typically, the dialectic of social change is as follows: there is a change in the law (often, an unpopular 
change) instituted by some group of social elites (often who have very-recently seized power); the enforcement of 
these laws results in a change in behaviors, one way or another. Over time, this change in behaviors leads to a 
change in attitudes as it becomes the "new normal" (especially for successive generations). That is, policies are the 
primary driver of socio-cultural change (to include normative shifts), not reason.  
We have previously explored how, despite the mythology of the Enlightenment, it played out in just the fashion 
described above. However, one can choose virtually any major social change—for instance, the civil rights 
movement in America.  
Again, it is fascinating to note that social change mirrors biological evolution, the process of science, and 
even the process of inspiration and creativity: moments of sudden and dramatic change followed by periods of 
consolidation/conservation.  
12  This specialization of ethics also neutralizes one of our earlier criticisms by introducing legitimate variation 
into the field. Due to the diversity among institutions in terms of relevant issues, who counts as moral agents, etc. 
there would be substantive differences in the sorts of policies advocated from institutions to institution, and from 
one context to another.  
 Appendix III: Postscript on Reductionism 
 
"Behind every image, something has disappeared. And that is the source of its fascination…  According to the 
official version, we worship the real and the reality principle, but—and this is the source of all the current 
suspense—is it, in fact, the real we worship, or its disappearance? " 
 
Jean Baudrillard  
Why Hasn't Everything Already Disappeared?  p. 32 
 
Plato was among the first to raise problem of the apparent tension between our words and 
our perceptions. Rather than trying to integrate the two, he believed that because our perceptions 
are faulty and inconsistent, they should be understood as being inferior to the more-enduring 
abstract concepts which frame them. In his own lifetime, this claim was most drastically 
challenged by Zeno of Elea, whose paradoxes continue to plague rationalists to this very day— 
but hopefully not hereafter.  
In his essay, “What Metaphors Mean,” Davidson argued that the distinction between 
literal and metaphorical language is false;1 the primary distinction between literal and 
metaphorical language is one of degree, not type. In his Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein suggested that every person speaks his own personal variation of social languages. 
He went on to argue that languages do not directly relate to “the world;” instead, cultures create 
“language games,” whose rules allow participants to derive meanings of complex expressions 
from their context. Michael Polanyi’s The Tacit Dimension posits that within a given language 
and culture, this context includes the larger linguistic or situational circumstances into which the 
expression was uttered,2 but it also includes those personal experiences which shape our 
hermeneutics. It is these premises, rather than mathematical or logical proofs, which hold the 
solution to Zeno’s Paradoxes.3 We will explore these ideas over the course of a few examples 
centered on the ordinary phenomenon of the Apple:  
 
II.  
Imagine that someone is standing before you and they hold up an object and say “apple,” 
in such a way as to indicate that the object they are holding is being referred to by the word. To 
what does the word “apple” refer? Suppose I was to ask you for more information about the item 
he is holding: which breed of apple is referred to by the word? What is its size, color, condition? 
How does it feel in the hand or taste in the mouth? Is it, in fact, an actual piece of fruit or a 
plastic simulacrum? Or a picture of an apple? Or just the letters, “A-P-P-L-E” written on a piece 
of paper? Or even an AppleTM product, such as an iPod?  In short, what can be said about this 
“apple” which supposedly is? 
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There are essentially two ways of responding to this question. The first method would be 
to fabricate the details according to your imagination; another option would be to concede 
aporia: we must admit that we know nothing about the “apple,” being referred to in the above 
example.  The word does not tell us anything; it is nearly meaningless if separated from context 
(even if we know what "apples" are). Most of us, when we encounter a word, choose the first 
option. Indeed, when encountering the word “apple,” in the previous example, it is possible that 
the term automatically evoked a number of assumptions in the reader which were later called 
into doubt. The significance of this phenomenon is difficult to overstate.  
Assume you are shopping in a supermarket and have the thought, “I want an apple.” 
Again, we use the term “apple,” as though all apples were the same— but we recognize the flaw 
in this assumption the moment we encounter the object to which the word is supposed to refer. If 
the material world operated the same way as language, we would not shop for produce at all: we 
would choose apples arbitrarily, or simply grab the most convenient “apple” within reach. But 
this is not how we choose apples. Instead, we narrow down, “apple,” by breed, size, condition, 
texture, etc. Eventually, we choose one that fits all of our criteria (many of which were 
unconscious); ultimately, we did not want an “apple,” but rather, a specific object, unique from 
others “of its kind,” an object which has no name and could never be captured in its fullness by 
language—a specific item we had no knowledge of or way to refer to until we actually 
encountered it. That is, an “apple” is not an [Apple]. Words do not refer to “things,” instead, they 
illicit templates of “things.” Nouns refer to genres, not items.4 
 
III. 
Intuitively, there is a legitimate distinction to be made in naming the genre “apple” as 
distinct from the rest of the material world. In fact, once we come to understand the genre, it 
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to view an [Apple] without associating it with its genre 
(“apple”). But what it is that makes an “apple” an “apple” is largely tacit and partially 
inexplicable. Moreover, it varies across people and contexts.  
Imagine asking a botanist, a chef, an artist, a farmer, a linguist, and someone from a 
different time and/or culture, “What makes an apple an apple?”  That is, “what makes an apple 
distinct from all other objects?” Or, “what does ‘apple’ mean?” If you were to ask a thousand 
people, it is likely that you would get a thousand different responses. It may be that the 
differences are largely questions of emphasis which do not contradict one-another— but these 
differences in emphasis are significant nonetheless insofar as they demonstrate that the term 
“apple” does not make a uniform semantic contribution, even within the same sentence, if we 
simply change the audience.  
Were we to allow this diverse group to work together at comprising a list of traits that 
applied to 100% of apples, without exception, there may be some common “core” applicable to 
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all apples and agreeable to all people— but it is likely that these traits would be general to the 
point of being insufficient to distinguish an apple from, say, a pear. And these problems are just 
in defining the genre itself— it would be much more complex to distinguish an individual apple 
from the rest of its kind. And “apple” is a relatively simple phenomenon of which we can find 
straightforward instances in the physical world. Imagine performing the aforementioned 
examples with a word like “justice,” or “friendship.” 
In short, there is no uniform or objective use of language. Each of us internalizes words 
in a different context of life experiences and linguistic understanding. Through communication, 
we can mitigate our personal language variations, but they can never be truly reconciled.  
For instance, if we are to understand empathy as “feeling someone else’s pain/pleasure,” 
then it must be admitted that empathy is impossible. Other minds interpret my appearance, 
words, actions, and reputation (which comprise the totality of my “raw existence” in other 
minds) — that is to say, they interpret “me” in the context of themselves: their feelings, their 
experience, their beliefs, their perceptions; and this interpretation is not even based on the 
totality of my appearances, words, actions, and reputation—but only that small fragment of these 
which a particular person has access to. Empathy is not someone else feeling my feelings, but 
rather a counterfactual projection of how someone else believes they would feel in similar 
circumstances (as they understand them). Indeed, it is an impossible feat for the human mind to 
remove itself from context, which is the essential demand of objectivity.5  
 
IV.  
 Imagine you have a friend who went blind at age 30; when talking to him you use the 
term “red apple.” In this instance, the term “red” is comprehensible. Although he cannot see at 
present, we may reasonably assume that he knows the meaning of the adjective. Now consider 
using the same term when speaking to a person who was born blind. In this case, “red” is 
incomprehensible and it cannot be explained through words. It is irreducible to language if 
independent of experience:  
 One could describe “red” in terms of metaphors: comparing the color to blood or fire or 
passion—that is, he could come to understand the symbolism of “red.” One could explain to him 
that colors are the result of light refracting off of the atmosphere, etc. But for all of that, he 
would have no idea what “red” actually looks like. This is substantial because appearance is the 
most significant aspect of “red;” it is the foundation upon which even the symbolic aspects are 
built.  
For instance, our born-blind friend would soon realize that red apples do not taste more 
passionate than green ones; that is, the metaphor does not tell you the meaning of “red.”  
Through taste, he may eventually come to distinguish the taste of “red” apples from “green 
apples,” but this does not let him know the meaning of “red,” either. The flavor, texture, and size 
differences between red and green apples would not apply to red vs. green peppers or sweaters or 
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traffic lights because the distinction between red and green is not flavor but appearance. In short, 
one cannot really know the meaning of “red” unless they see it. All the language in the world 




As language does not correspond to objects, but rather to ideals and abstracts, its nature is 
to extrapolate characteristics categorically. “Apple,” is not an item, it is a mental construct. 
However, an [Apple], and indeed every actual object, is infinitely different from all others, 
conceptually united with others in its genre (and composed as distinct objects in the first place) 
only in our minds.  
For instance, no two apple trees are the same; each is slightly different genetically and 
molecularly, due to history and environmental conditions. Even if one were to clone a tree, such 
that two trees were genetically identical, and the trees were then planted in as similar 
environments as possible— as they grew, one would find that branches would grow in slightly 
different directions, flowers may bloom from slightly different stems. That is, while genetically 
identical, they would eventually cease to be identical visibly or, especially, molecularly.  
And even if one managed to encounter an exact duplicate of a phenomenon, one would 
not be able to encounter it in the exact same spacial/ temporal context, under the exact same 
circumstances. Nor could we approach it in the same state of mind (if for no other reason than 
the corruption caused by the memory of the previous encounter). For this reason, every 
experience is completely unique and inimitable. When you encounter a phenomenon, no one else 
can experience your encounter in this way, in this place, at this time, in this state of mind, (ad 
infinitum); in fact, you cannot even experience it again yourself.  
 
VI.  
Insofar as words are referential, the connection between a word and its referent domain is 
arbitrary.6 There is nothing particularly “appley” about the combination of sounds (or letters, if 
written) which comprise to term “apple.” We can imagine an alternative language wherein the 
same combination of sounds refers to a different genre of items; perchance, in another language, 
“apple” could even be a verb or an adjective. Similarly, while many of these genres seem to 
transcend specific languages, they are referred to with different words7—for instance, in 
Spanish, “manzana” refers to the class of items which English labels, “apple.” That is, even after 
we acknowledge that words refer to classes of things rather than things themselves, we must 
further concede that there is no meaningful connection between words and the genres of 
phenomena to which they “refer.” This is especially true of (physical and/or abstract) artifacts:  
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We say “cup” for a whole host of items, as though a cup actually exists outside of the 
semantics of utility. Imagine there is a nuclear holocaust in which all humans are killed and only 
our possessions and/or ruins remain. “Cups” would cease to exist: insofar as a “cup” is a vessel 
from which to drink, an artifact would cease to be a “cup” if there were no humans to drink from 
it. What would an artifact which we refer to as a “cup,” function as to a rat, for instance?  
There is no “America,” in Reality, only in the minds of men. Sure, the land that 
comprises what we call America probably exists in some pure sense, but there is nothing 
particularly “American” about it. It existed before the concept of America and will continue after 
America is forgotten. Such it is with all our distinctions. I was not born in any particular place, in 
any particular time. The circumstances we would use to describe my birth do not actually exist, 
and they never have. Where are the phenomena of 6PM or 1983 outside of language? 
 
VII. 
At the heart of Zeno’s Paradoxes is the profound insight that the world does not operate 
in the same manner as language and mathematics.  When we use the word “apple,” we are 
conceptually separating a genre of phenomena from the rest of the material world. This 
conceptual framing, however, does not correspond to any actual distinction in existence.8 
Similarly, when measuring a span of time in an equation, we cannot actually isolate a segment of 
time from the whole, nor can we isolate a section of space. Regarding motion, there can be no 
presupposition of a beginning or end to it because there is no such thing as stasis, nor are there 
“objects” for movement to be exercised upon: any item is comprised of smaller particles, which 
are comprised of smaller particles, and can be broken down into even smaller components, which 
are constantly in flux. At the most foundational level, it appears that there is not matter at all, but 
rather energy blinking arbitrarily in and out of “being.”  
One could also follow this logic by scaling up: each “item” is itself a mere component 
connected with and dependent upon a host of other phenomena which, at the highest threshold, 
comprise [That Which Is]. This is the monistic point that Zeno was trying to make: time and 
space (and therefore, objects and motion) are inseparable from the whole of existence. To take 
language or measurements too literally is tantamount to ontological decontextualization.9 
Languages are always and only metaphorical and categorical. Similarly, logic relies upon general 
rules and cannot deal well with nuance or exceptions. When the linearity and homogeneity of 




Out of his love of “Logos,” Plato imagined that somewhere things had to be as we say; 
language has to be true. For this reason, he posited his dual states of existence. And in a 
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profound sense, this dualism may be “true,” although he had its dynamic reversed: there is not 
some “higher” Ideal world, of which the world we experience is a degradation. Rather, the 
“actual” world is the “base” or “lower” world upon which we have built the world of our 
experience— flavoring it with purpose, connection, and potential. We live in the world of Ideals, 
it is the same as the world of our experience. Our experiential reality supersedes and is built on 
top of the “real” world. 
The nature of the connections between the world we perceive and “the world that is its 
base” is unknowable; but that Real world would necessarily be meaningless, and therefore, the 
pursuit of that world also.10 This world of Ideals is all we have. But rather than merely settling 
for it, we can shape it. The “reality” we have constructed is one of passions, of depth, 
complexity, and purpose—framing our actions and our lives with meaning. Zeno’s Paradoxes 
only pose a threat to this world insofar as we refuse to see it for what it is: a (re)interpretation.11  
1  The essence of Davidson’s argument was the elimination of the literal/metaphorical distinction—for the 
reference, however, he emphasized the literal nature of language, to include metaphors. Here, I am accepting his 
basic premise while rejecting the supposed literalness of language.  
2  This, in contrast with the Compositional argument which claims, essentially, that grammar and word-
meaning are the only criteria required for understanding complex expressions. 
3  It will become clear over the course of our investigation that while Zeno’s paradoxical examples are 
varied, they all raise the same essential objection.  
4  Using modifiers like, “this apple,” or “that apple,” may allow an audience to circumvent the problem of 
generality in nouns, but only if they are familiar with the context in which the utterance is made. If I pose the same 
example, but the speaker in the front of the room says, “this apple,” instead of just “apple,” we are provided with 
no additional information. Similarly, if he said, “This is an apple.”  
We can only understand what is being referred to with the word through a larger context. For instance, if we were 
actually present in the classroom where the speaker was talking, or if we were to read the word in a paragraph 
wherein it was eventually revealed that the item in question was actually a picture or a piece of fruit, etc. 
5  In order to altogether eliminate the need for interpretation on the part of the audience, the hearer would 
need a complete understanding of the speaker’s experience, perception, emotion, mastery of language, 
interpretation of the language, ad infinitum. In short, the hearer would also have to be the speaker instead of 
himself, or the simultaneously be the speaker and himself. Either way, it is impossible.  
6  In his Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke offers a Causal Theory of Reference (fixing and borrowing) which 
aspires to explain how terms come to be used as referents, even for objects (or classes of objects) with which we 
are not acquainted (although the most significant aspect of the theory may be the severance of the long-held 
connection between necessary and a priori truths vs. contingent and a posteriori claims). 
7  Translation is a difficult and nuanced project precisely because reductionism is false. Because words do 
not refer to items, but to socio-cultural constructs, and much is lost in any translation. One can translate “apple” 
from one language to another (assuming the concept of apple is also present in that language), but the significance 
and symbolism of “apples” may vary wildly from one context to another. A native of a given language and culture 
would instantly pick up on a number of facets which cannot be translated directly, and would often be difficult to 
meaningfully annotate.  
8  The only recorded incident of authentically literal language (if the record is even to be believed) is in 
Genesis, when God proclaimed the universe’s existence, and it was. By this account, Reality seems to be a mere 
speech-act of God—one which transcended language or social contexts and into the material realm. 
9  For an alternative conception of time and space, see Henri Bergson’s conception of “Duration,” as 
described in his Matter and Memory.  
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10  Here, the most grievous flaw of Empiricism is also revealed: empiricists place, as the foundation of all 
knowledge, “the real world;” however, this world is not something we can experience objectively, if at all. And 
insofar as we experience Reality, it has no meaning apart from that which we ourselves ascribe to it. And finally, 
Reality, due to its infinite specificity and ever-changing nature, is completely ineffable (again, what we 
communicate via language is not Reality). In short, the foundation upon which empiricism is built is essentially a 
black-hole; empiricism, like rationalism, is self-defeating. Defeasible Coherentism presents an alternative, more 
viable, attitude to adopt towards knowledge.  
11  Mutatis mutandis, the relationship between the objective Reality and our personal experience may be 
analogous to that of the Iliad and the Aeneid.  
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